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Chapter 1
Introduction
The direction in which education starts a man
will determine his future life.
Plato—The Republic (Book IV)
People spend most of their youth in education. On average, students in OECD countries
will receive about eight thousand hours of instruction during their primary and lower
secondary education, and 80 percent of these students will continue to upper secondary
or tertiary education (OECD, 2013). As the amount of human capital available in the
labor force is a crucial element for a country’s growth and well-being (Goldin and Katz,
2009), education is important for both the present and the future. Individuals thus
have strong incentives for pursuing more education, and governments have incentives for
building on the skills of the population through education.
Since the pioneering theoretical contributions of Becker (1962) and Schultz (1961)
and the early empirical work of Griliches (1977) and Mincer (1974), research in economics
of education has been examining the effects and outcomes of individual investments in
education. The economic literature shows three main outcomes of education: knowledge,
1
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earnings, and employability. First, education empowers individuals by increasing their
knowledge, thereby helping people make competent decisions about their life inside—and
outside—the labor market (Hanushek, 2013). Second, income from employment tends
to rise in line with an individual’s level of education (Harmon et al., 2003). In OECD
countries, for example, workers with tertiary education earn on average 1.5 times as much
as workers with only an upper secondary education (OECD, 2012). Third, educational
attainment has a large impact on employability. Individuals with more education are
more likely to have a job and to be working full-time than those without (Kettunen,
1997).
The aim of this dissertation is to provide an elaborate analysis of the impact of
education on these three outcomes, with a particular focus on causal relationships and
heterogeneous effects. The first project of this dissertation investigates the effects of
early childhood educational practices on student knowledge, measured by standardized
test scores. Using data from a randomized experiment, I estimate the effect of smaller
classes and classes with a teacher’s aide on pupil test scores. I examine effect heterogeneity
for pupils of different achievement levels and then study the persistence of these effects
in later grades. In the second project, I focus on the second educational outcome of
interest, earnings. I examine the monetary returns to education, with a particular focus
on the effects of investing in education over the distribution of wages, to uncover potential
heterogeneous effects of education on wages, and to discover who would profit most
from acquiring additional schooling. The third project of the dissertation studies the
third outcome deriving from investments in human capital: employability. I investigate
size and persistence of wage losses after lay-off, to discover whether individuals undergo
permanent scars when they lose their job. Furthermore, I examine the determinant of
involuntary job losses to understand how the likelihood of experiencing an involuntary
job loss is moderated by quantity and type of education.
The potential of education is limited if an individual’s cognitive skills are not de-
2
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veloped early (Doyle et al., 2009), especially because essential competencies are better
acquired during the first years of life (Doyle et al., 2013). Therefore, high-quality kinder-
garten and primary school lay a strong learning foundation that is fundamental to the
rest of the lives of the individuals involved. Class size is probably the most used—and
universally accepted—measure for education quality (Hanushek, 1999), and several de-
veloped countries are applying policies of class size reduction with the aim of improving
student achievement (Lazear, 2001). However, the empirical evidence on the topic is
often mixed (Fredriksson et al., 2014), and the long-term effects of lower pupil-to-teacher
ratios are also being debated (Chetty et al., 2011).
To fill these gaps, in chapter two I use data from a large-scale student-to-teacher ratio
experiment to estimate the impact on achievement of being in a smaller class or a regular-
size class with a teacher’s aide, compared to a regular-size one. Given that children have
different levels of ability, I let the effect of pupil-to-teacher ratio be heterogeneous over the
achievement distribution. This distributional analysis allows me to answer the question
of who profits more from being in a smaller class or in a regular-size class with a teacher’s
aide. Results show that mid-achievers profit the most from being assigned to a smaller
class. Students at the bottom or top of the achievement distribution experience only
minimal gains from being in a small class.
The analysis also reveals a positive and significant effect of a regular class with
a teacher’s aide for students at the bottom of the achievement distribution, an effect
stronger for boys and disadvantaged children (low socioeconomic status and ethnic mi-
norities)0. In line with previous research (Krueger and Whitmore, 2001), I show that
being assigned to a small class during early grades has a positive effect on test scores in
later grades, on the likelihood of on-time high school graduation, and on taking college
readiness assessment exams. Interestingly, the positive effects on test scores are driven
mostly by high achievers, suggesting that the long-term benefits of being in a small class
shrink more quickly for low- and mid-achieving students. By contrast, the positive effects
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on on-time high school graduation and on college exam-taking are present for the entire
population of students.
After focusing on the impact on achievement of lower pupil-to-teacher ratios in early
education, chapters three and four examine the value of education at a later stage of life,
i.e., in the labor market. Although the literature reports sizable returns to education
(Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1998), there are at least three considerations that need further
research and discussion. First, whether a positive association between educational at-
tainment and wage implies a causal relationship remains unclear.1 Although individuals
with higher ability and motivation acquire more education and have higher wages, such
individuals may have earned the same wage even without education. Second, assuming
the return to education to be equal for every individual appears unrealistic. In David
Card’s words,2 “Is the labor force reasonably well-described by a constant return to edu-
cation for all workers?” As the answer is “probably not,” we should expect heterogeneous
returns to education, especially for individuals at different wage levels. Third, most of
the research focuses on the pure monetary benefits of education. However, human capital
externalities (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001) such as employability might also exist, and
are likely to be heterogeneous as well (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). Employability
in particular plays a crucial role when workers are laid off, because workers with differ-
ent educational backgrounds might have completely different re-employment prospects
(Farber, 2003).
Taken together, these three considerations make the analysis of investments in hu-
man capital difficult yet compelling. In this dissertation, I take these considerations into
account by estimating heterogeneous returns to education (chapter three) and both the
effects and determinants of involuntary separations (chapter four). In chapter three, I
use administrative and survey data from Switzerland to identify the causal link between
education and wages at different points of the distribution of wages. The analysis allows
1See, e.g., Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994); Card (2012); Griliches and Mason (1972); Spence (1973);
Willis and Rosen (1979).
2See Card (1994), p. 33.
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me to discover the potential heterogeneous effects of education on wages, answering the
question of who would profit the most from additional education. Building on a theo-
retical model of endogenous schooling with heterogeneous returns,3 my empirical results
show that there is no unique causal effect of education and that for each individual the
effect may deviate from those extensively documented by mean regression or instrumen-
tal variable estimation. In particular, once both the endogeneity of schooling and the
heterogeneity in returns are taken into account, I estimate higher returns in lower parts
of the wage distribution. Interpreting the wage distribution as a proxy for (unobserved)
ability, the results suggest that higher-ability individuals have higher wages, but the slope
of their wage-education profile is flatter than that for lower-ability individuals.
Observing a steeper slope at the bottom end of the distribution has important impli-
cations for both research and policy. From the research perspective, the finding indicates
that more able individuals acquire more schooling because they face lower marginal costs
and not because they experience higher marginal benefits. This gives empirical support
to early theoretical contributions by Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998). From a policy per-
spective, it suggests that public policy should focus on the lower part of the distribution
to efficiently allocate resources. Moreover, similar to the findings of chapter two, my
analysis reveals that enhancing educational outcomes of individuals at different positions
in the ability distribution not only calls for different practices (e.g., having a teacher’s
aide) but also implies different returns to human capital investments. Although this
might appear rather intuitive, my dissertation is the first in providing clear and causal
empirical evidence on these heterogeneous effects of education.
In a further step, I analyze another type of heterogeneity by comparing the returns
to one extra year of academic education with the returns to one extra year of vocational
education, to investigate whether one track brings a return premium at any point in the
wage distribution. Looking at the heterogeneity patterns, I observe two relevant features
3Original model by Card (1994), further extended by Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) and Arias et al.
(2001).
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of the returns to vocational and academic education. First, I find significant heterogeneity
within each educational path, and, second, a comparison between the two tracks reveals
that academic education does not always yield higher returns. In the upper part of the
wage distribution, workers with an academic background experience higher returns than
individuals with a vocational background. However, in lower parts of the distribution,
vocational education brings higher returns than academic education. These results imply
that answering the question of who would profit more from investments in human capital
is not as easy as descriptive statistics or mean regression might suggest. Indeed, the
answer depends on the individual’s position in the wage (ability) distribution.
Chapter four studies the last outcome of investments in human capital I introduced
before, i.e., employability. Using data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey, I estimate the
earning losses of workers experiencing an involuntary job separation. To avoid selection
biases arising from low-productive workers being dismissed (Akerlof, 1970; Gibbons and
Katz, 1991), I apply several econometric specifications to achieve valid estimates of the
earning losses. The results show large and persistent wage and productivity losses follow-
ing an involuntary job loss, compared with a worker’s expected level had the separation
never happened. Analyzing other reasons for separation, I observe that the earning loss
pattern is unique for involuntary separations, because no other type of separation implies
such long-term losses.
Given the size and persistence of earnings losses, I also study the determinants of
involuntary separations, with a particular focus on education as a protection against job
loss. Previous literature (Kettunen, 1997; Mincer, 1991) suggests that the incidence of
unemployment is lower among highly educated workers. Going beyond these findings, I
focus not only on education level but also on the type of education, distinguishing be-
tween academic and vocational tracks. I find that tertiary education plays a major role
in reducing the risk of job loss, independent of the type. This result suggests that both
tertiary academic and tertiary vocational education are the best protection against invol-
6
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untary separation. Given the impossibility of avoiding persistent losses once separation
occurs, the findings of chapter four highlight the importance of reducing the likelihood of
involuntary separation before it happens. Investments in human capital appear to help
the most in preventing involuntary job losses, implying that outcomes depend not only
on the reason for job loss but also on education.
Chapter five synthesizes the key elements of the preceding chapters and concludes. It
also presents and discusses further research questions and policy implications that follow
from the findings of this dissertation.
7

Chapter 2
Distributional Effects of Class Size
and Teacher Aide
[ A version of this paper is also available as: “Revisiting class-size effects: where they come
from and how long they last” Swiss Leading House Working Paper no.102 ]
2.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, the subject that has received the most public, political, and aca-
demic attention in education economics is class size (Hoxby, 2000). Reducing class size to
increase student achievement is a policy measure that has gained major consideration in
the U.S., Europe, and Australia. Currently, many countries have enacted or are consid-
ering class size reduction with the aim of improving student achievement (Mu¨ller, 2013).
In the U.S., for example, the student-to-teacher ratio in a given district is frequently used
as a measure for education quality, and comparisons across districts are used as indices
9
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of equity (Hanushek, 1999). However, there is still debate on the effects of class size,
and we contribute to the literature by analyzing whether these effects are systematically
different for students at different achievement levels.
Although smaller classes should theoretically have positive effects on student achieve-
ment (Lazear, 2001; Todd and Wolpin, 2003), empirical evidence is often mixed. Studies
that rely on experimental data usually find positive effects of class size reduction on
student test scores (Fletcher, 2009; Krueger, 1999). In contrast, most non-experimental
studies report small or negligible class-size effects (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hoxby, 2000;
Woessmann and West, 2006). Likewise, long-term effects of smaller classes are also under
debate. Many studies have attempted to determine whether there are long-term benefits
associated with early childhood interventions such as class-size reductions. Most of these
studies report significant benefits that last for a few years after program implementation
(Krueger and Whitmore, 2001), but that tend to fade over time (Chetty et al., 2011).
Despite the remarkable amount of literature on class size, almost all studies focus
on average outcomes. This focus might appear surprising, especially in light of the unde-
niable policy relevance of class size effects for children at different levels of achievement.
Most studies attempt to deal with heterogeneous effects by using sub-sample analyses
(Schanzenbach, 2006). However, evaluating the impact of smaller classes on groups that
are only “more likely” to be low achieving (e.g., ethnic minorities or students eligible for
free lunches) misses important dimensions of effect heterogeneity (Bitler et al., 2006).
In this chapter, we use data from the Tennessee Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio
experiment (also known simply as Project STAR) to examine the distributional effects
of being assigned to a small class or a regular class with a teacher’s aide, compared to
a regular class. Project STAR—labeled “one of the great experiments in education in
U.S. history” by Mosteller et al. (1996)—involved the random assignment of over 11,000
K-31 students at roughly 80 public schools to either a small class (i.e., fewer students
1Pupils from kindergarten through third grade.
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than usual), a regular class, or a regular class with a teacher’s aide. The experiment
began with random assignment of kindergartners and teachers in the mid 1980s, and
their assignment to each treatment condition was intended to continue through third
grade.
To estimate distributional effects, we employ the unconditional quantile regression
approach, recently developed by Firpo et al. (2009). This estimator provides a direct
measure of how a marginal change in the level of one variable affects the distribution
of achievement in the population, keeping the distribution of other characteristics equal.
Unconditional quantile regression differs from conventional quantile regression2 in that
treatment effects are not conditional on the mean value of included explanatory variables
and do not depend on the relative position of an individual among the (virtual) population
of individuals who share the same observed characteristics (Fournier and Koske, 2013).
In the second part of the chapter, to estimate the effects of a small class and a
regular class with an aide through high school, we use data from Project STAR follow-up
surveys. We focus on test score outcomes, on-time high school graduation, and college
exam-taking. In particular, we are interested in whether the effects are different for
students who were low, mid-, or high achievers during Project STAR, to study, from a
distributional point of view, not only the emergence of class size effects but also their
persistence.
Our results show considerable heterogeneity in the treatment effects “small class”
and “regular class with aide,” suggesting that average effects—while of interest—hide
crucial features about the rest of the distribution. We find that mid-achieving pupils
profit the most from being assigned to a small class, whereas pupils at the bottom and
top of the achievement distribution experience only minimal gains from being in a small
class. We also reveal positive and significant effects of an aide in a regular class for low-
achieving pupils, i.e., pupils at the bottom 20 percent of the achievement distribution.
2In the sense of Koenker and Bassett (1978).
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Interestingly, the effect of having a class aide is strongest for boys and disadvantaged
children, to the point that such effect is as strong as that of small classes for the same
type of pupils.
Regarding the long-term effects of class size, we analyze three outcomes: test scores
in later grades, on-time high school graduation, and college entrance exam-taking. In
line with previous research, we find that average effects on test scores in later grades
tend to shrink. Adding to the existing literature, we show that the effects in later grades
remain strong for Project STAR high achievers, whereas they vanish completely for low
and mid-achievers. This result may help resolve the debate on the existence of a long-
term effect of class size on test scores, because it suggests that the long-term benefits
of being in a small class fade very quickly for low- and mid-achieving students. For the
aide treatment, we find no long-term effect on test scores. Concerning the impact of
“small class” and “regular class with aide” on on-time high school graduation and college
exam-taking, we find positive and significant (average) effects. The effect size of smaller
classes and classes with an aide are very similar, further underling the importance of the
aide treatment aide.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 gives an overview
of the theoretical background and empirical literature relevant for class size and Project
STAR. Section 2.3 briefly introduces the data set, presents some descriptive statistics, and
tests the validity of the experimental design (covariate balance and nonrandom attrition).
Section 2.4 shows the econometric models in detail. Section 2.5 presents the results, and
section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Theory and Empirical Background
Education economists have invested a lot of effort in studying class-size effects, mainly
for two reasons. First, class size is readily measurable and modifying it constitutes a
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relatively easy policy to implement—although expensive. Moreover, both teachers and
parents usually perceive class size to be negatively correlated with student achievement.
Second, traditional economic theory suggests that smaller classes have a positive impact
on achievement (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). In every education production function, class
size is always listed along with other relevant school resources such as teacher qualification
and school funding (Hanushek, 2002).
In terms of mechanisms, Lazear (2001) argues that disruptive students who take
up instructional time in ways not useful to other students affect not only their own
learning but also that of classmates. He argues that, in smaller classes, the likelihood of
having disruptive students decreases, allowing teachers to spend less time on correcting
misbehavior. Furthermore, teachers might find teaching less costly in terms of effort if
they have to manage smaller classes, simply because they have fewer students to supervise
(Angrist and Lavy, 1999).
Although theoretical research suggests positive effects of smaller classes on student
achievement, the empirical evidence is mixed. On the one hand, studies relying on ex-
perimental data consistently find positive causal effects of class size reduction on student
test scores (Fletcher, 2009; Krueger, 1999, 2003) and non-cognitive skills (Dee and West,
2011; Ding and Lehrer, 2011; DePaola et al., 2013). On the other hand, non-experimental
studies present a less optimistic view of class size effects. Indeed, most non-experimental
studies report either relatively small class-size effects (Woessmann and West, 2006) or no
effects at all (Hoxby, 2000; Woessmann, 2005). The long-term effect of smaller classes
is also a matter of debate. While the literature finds positive effects in both elementary
and secondary school (Fletcher, 2009; Krueger and Whitmore, 2001), the benefits in the
labor market are very small at best (Chetty et al., 2011). Lazear (2001) explains this
lack of empirical support in the non-experimental literature by arguing that teachers (and
schools) adjust their behavior to smaller classes, therefore bringing no significant effects
on test scores.
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The effects of class size and pupil-to-teacher-ratio over the achievement distribution
are much less analyzed. While we might expect that class size reductions could have
different impacts on children with different cognitive abilities, the empirical literature
left this question unanswered. Only few recent studies (Jackson and Page, 2013; Kon-
stantopoulos, 2008) have attempted to tackle this heterogeneity issue, but the evidence
remains mixed. To better understand the effects of class size reduction on the achieve-
ment gap, Konstantopoulos (2008) examines the variance of test scores within smaller
and larger classes. He finds that class size reduction increases not only level of achieve-
ment but also variance in achievement. In addition, he finds no significant evidence that
smaller classes would reduce the achievement gap between low and high achievers.
To estimate the effects over the achievement distribution, Jackson and Page (2013)
employ a different econometric approach, finding that the largest test score gains are at
the top of the distribution. However, by estimating the class-size effect as a difference
between treatment and control groups at each percentile of the observed achievement
distribution, they provide only a measure of within-group variation. Their approach thus
loses not only the information coming from the rest of the distribution but also restricts
the estimates to the conditional distribution of achievement.
In this chapter, we first employ a new approach to estimating the quantile treatment
effect of class size over the entire achievement distribution. As we describe in section
2.4, we use the unconditional quantile regression method, which has several advantages
over standard quantile regression estimators and other approaches to study distributional
effects. Second, as none of the existing studies include a distributional analysis of the
treatment “regular size with aide” (pooling such treatment condition with the control
group, thus hiding the effect of aide), we also offer a detailed analysis of the effect of
“regular size with aide” and its impacts over the achievement distribution. Third, we
investigate distributional long-term effects of class size on later grades and high school.
Our goal is to investigate the persistence of class size effects and, if so, whether these
14
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long-term effects are heterogeneous for children at different achievement levels.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we briefly overview the data from Project STAR and the follow-up surveys
in the later grades and high school. Then we present descriptive statistics and covariate
balance. In the last part, to ensure that differential attrition patterns are not endangering
our identification strategy, we perform a complete attrition analysis for both Project
STAR and later grades.
2.3.1 Project STAR and Follow-up Data
We use data from the Tennessee Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio experiment, a
large-scale, randomized class-size experiment that took place between 1985 and 1989
and involved 11,600 students from kindergarten through third grade.3 Project STAR
was commissioned by the Tennessee state legislature and implemented by a consortium
of Tennessee universities and the Tennessee State Department of Education. The total
cost of the experiment, including the cost of hiring new teachers and classroom aides,
was approximately USD 12 million.
Initially, all school districts in Tennessee were asked to participate in Project STAR,
and about 180 schools in about 50 of the 141 state districts showed an interest. Only about
100 schools had enough students in each grade to meet the size criterion for participation.
This size criterion, which was necessary for allowing assignment to class types within
schools, excluded very small schools from the study. At the end of this selection process,
79 elementary schools in 42 school districts became part of Project STAR.
Districts had to agree to participate for four years and to allow site visitations for
3Finn and Achilles (1990); Folger and Breda (1989), and Word et al. (1990)—from which we draw
heavily in this section—present detailed information about the experiment.
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verification of class sizes, interviewing, and data collection. All schools had to allow the
random assignment of pupils and teachers to class types from kindergarten through third
grade. The experiment randomly assigned kindergarten pupils to small classes (target
enrollment between 13 and 17 students), regular classes (target enrollment between 22
and 26 students), or regular classes with a full-time teacher’s aide. These teachers’
aides did not have to possess any specific educational background and they did not
receive any particular training in their duties, their job was helping teachers prepare
materials for class and tutoring individual students with learning difficulties. The class-
type assignments of students and teachers were maintained through the third grade.
Children and teachers entering the study after kindergarten were also randomly assigned
to one of the treatments.
Although Project STAR covered only one state and one cohort, the experiment
included a heterogeneous set of schools from across Tennessee, including large and small,
urban and rural, and wealthy and poor districts. Consequently, the schools included in
the STAR data represent most of the educational conditions that exist in the United
States (Finn and Achilles, 1990; Krueger and Whitmore, 2001). Additionally, the data
includes detailed information on pupils, teachers, and schools, for which we can control
for.
The measure of achievement is the Stanford Achievement Test (SAT–9), which all
Project STAR children took at the end of each grade. The SAT–9 is a standardized,
multiple choice test that includes math, reading, and word identification as subject ar-
eas. Because there are no standard units for the test results, we follow Krueger (1999)
by scaling the test scores into percentile ranks. Specifically, at each grade level and for
each treatment condition, we assign percentile scores based on students’ raw test scores,
ranging from 0 (lowest score) to 100 (highest score). For each subject test (math, reading,
word), we generate a separate percentile distribution and, to summarize overall achieve-
ment, we calculate the average of the three SAT–9 percentile rankings for each student.
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As a robustness check, we also perform the analysis using standardized scores (z-scores)
instead of percentile ranks as in Jackson and Page (2013), with very similar results.4
Although after leaving Project STAR all students returned to regular-size classes,
they were followed through high school, from which students graduate after successfully
completing grades 1–12. Consequently, the students are usually 17-18 years old by the
time they finish high school. In their last or next-to-last year of high school, students
who intend to enroll in college take the ACT or SAT exam. During grades 4 through 8,
the Tennessee Department of Education provided researchers with standardized achieve-
ment test scores, and matched such test scores to the appropriate Project STAR cohorts.5
Similarly, the College Board, together with the Educational Testing Service, linked in-
formation on high school seniors in the class of 1998 who took the ACT or SAT exam
to records of the 11,600 children who participated in Project STAR, regardless of where
the former Project STAR students resided in 1998. The resulting data set contains high
school records of Project STAR students, as well as whether they took either the ACT
or SAT exam, and what their test score was.
2.3.2 Covariate Balance in STAR
The main advantage of a randomized experiment is that it provides a solution to the
problem of causal inference. In principle, if randomization is done appropriately, the
mean outcomes of the treatment and control groups can stand as counterfactuals for one
another, making inference about the effects of the treatment relative to the control trans-
parent. If the treatment conditions were truly randomly assigned to pupils in each school,
then individuals in the treatment and control groups should have—in expectation—the
same pre-intervention characteristics. One way to test this condition is to check whether
assignment to a treatment condition is predictive of pupil and teacher characteristics. If
4See appendix Table 2.7.3
5From fourth grade through eighth, the Tennessee Department of Education provided researchers
with standardized achievement tests (the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program).
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pupils and teachers were properly randomized within schools, we should observe no statis-
tically significant relationship between each treatment condition and all pre-intervention
covariates.
To check for random assignment, which was performed at entry into Project STAR,
we disaggregate the data into waves according to the grade in which children entered the
experiment.6 Then, for each cohort, we regress student and teacher characteristics on
the treatment dummies. We also have to include school fixed effects, because random
assignment was only valid within schools. We finally perform an F -test of the hypothesis
that the class-type dummies had no joint effect.
Table 2.3.1 presents the results, divided according to grade cohorts. Although we
focus only on kindergarten and first grade, the results for the second and third grades are
very similar.7 In Table 2.3.1, the p-values of the class-size dummies exceed 0.05, meaning
that there is no significant difference in observable characteristics across treatments. The
only exception, of course, is class size itself. In one case the p-value is less than 0.10.
It appears that less experienced teachers were assigned to the regular first-grade classes.
Nonetheless, the difference is only marginally significant.
Table 2.3.1 also presents attrition rates for each treatment group and for kindergarten
and first grade. We define attrition as a binary variable that equals one if a pupil ever left
the study, and zero otherwise. Once we have the attrition variable, we regress it on the
treatment indicators and the school fixed effects. For pupils who entered Project STAR
in first grade, we find no evidence of different attrition rates among treatment groups.
However, for pupils who entered in kindergarten, those assigned to a regular class—either
with an aide or without—appear more likely to have left the sample.
Because we are also interested in the distributional effects of class size, we check
randomization over the achievement distribution. To do so, we divide the achievement
distribution into quartiles and regress student and teacher characteristics on the treat-
6Krueger (1999) and Krueger and Whitmore (2001) use similar approaches.
7Results are available upon request.
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Table 2.3.1: Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance
Small Regular Aide Joint p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Kindergarten
Class size 15.1 22.4 22.8 0.00**
Girl 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.89
Black 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.45
Age (in 1985) 4.66 4.64 4.65 0.48
Free-lunch eligible 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.51
Black teacher 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.40
Teacher with master 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.65
Teacher experience 9.90 10.1 10.7 0.38
Attrition 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.02*
B. First Grade
Class size 15.9 22.7 23.5 0.00**
Girl 0.49 0.44 0.46 0.41
Black 0.36 0.43 0.34 0.11
Age (in 1985) 4.98 5.06 5.08 0.21
Free-lunch eligible 0.59 0.62 0.61 0.34
Black teacher 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.58
Teacher with master 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.88
Teacher experience 13.9 11.0 13.2 0.09†
Attrition 0.53 0.51 0.47 0.52
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Ordinary least squares models with
robust standard errors clustered at the school level. Sample size in panel A ranges
from 5,902 to 6,325 and in panel B ranges from 2,190 to 2,314.
Project STAR data, Authors’ calculations.
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ment dummies and school fixed effects. Appendix Table 2.7.1 presents the results for
the below-median part of the achievement distribution, whereas appendix Table 2.7.2
presents the results for the above-median part of the achievement distribution. As in the
mean comparison case, the distributional analysis shows differences in class size across
the treatments that are significant at the highest level, suggesting that we are able to
identify the effects of class size over the entire distribution. In the first two quartiles of the
achievement distribution (appendix table 2.7.1), we observe only a marginally significant
under-representation of girls in the regular class group at the bottom quartile in kinder-
garten (p = 0.10), and a marginally significant difference in teacher experience (p = 0.07)
at the bottom quartile in first grade. For all other pupil and teacher characteristics, the
p-values of the class-size dummies are beyond any significance level.
A similar picture emerges from the upper part of the achievement distribution (ap-
pendix table 2.7.2), where we observe a 5-percent significant over-representation of girls
in the regular class group at the top quartile in kindergarten (p = 0.02). The other de-
mographic characteristics have a p-value of the class-size dummies that exceeds 0.05. In
first grade we estimate a marginally significant difference in age (third quartile, p = 0.10),
share of black teachers (third quartile, p = 0.10), and teacher experience (top quartile,
p = 0.06). In the distributional analysis, we find no evidence of different attrition rates
across the treatments.
Overall, we find no apparent evidence that initial assignment to class types was
highly correlated with either pupil or teacher characteristics. Therefore, we can be rea-
sonably confident that, within schools, both pupils and teachers were randomly assigned
to the treatment conditions, and that the randomization holds both at the mean and over
the achievement distribution. When we estimate the treatment effects, we nevertheless
condition not only on school fixed effects but also on all observable student and teacher
characteristics, to increase the precision of the point estimates and control for those few
significant differences we find in tables 2.3.1, 2.7.1, and 2.7.2.
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2.3.3 Attrition Analysis
In every longitudinal study, one portion of the population of interest leaves the sample.
In Project STAR, attrition was relatively high (Hanushek, 1999; Krueger and Whitmore,
2001), and if outcome data are missing for some pupils, we might be concerned that
the potential outcomes for those who are observed in the treatment group differ from
the potential outcomes for those observed in the control group. For example, if children
who were assigned to regular classes and who left the sample had on average higher test
scores than children who were assigned to small classes and who also left the sample, then
the small class effects will be biased upwards.8 Even if attrition is not different across
treatment groups, departures could yield analytic samples that vary significantly from
the original sample, limiting external validity of estimated causal effects. For example, if
girls are more likely to leave the study, then estimates of class size effects on achievement
based on a disproportionately male sample may not apply to both sexes.
Although there is no data on students who left Project STAR before the test scores
were collected, we can look for evidence of nonrandom attrition by examining differences
in observable characteristics across treatment conditions. To do so, we regress an indica-
tor of whether a student ever left STAR on the treatment dummies and an interaction
between the treatment dummies and the pre-intervention characteristics. Our definition
of attrition includes both children permanently lost to follow-up and others who reappear
in the sample after having been missing from one or more intermediate waves after an
initial entry. This definition is reasonable because for those pupils who left the study
for one or more years, we do not know what treatment they were exposed to during the
missing period(s).
Table 2.3.2 presents the p-values of the coefficients on the interaction between the
treatment indicator and a given student characteristic. Panel A shows the results for
8This differential attrition may occur if high-income families of students in regular classes were more
likely to withdraw their children from public schools and send them to private ones, because they would
have preferred their children to be assigned to smaller classes.
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Table 2.3.2: Differential Attrition in STAR and in Follow-up Surveys
Girl Black Age Free-lunch Percentile
(in 1985) Eligible Rank Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Assigned to Small
Project STAR
Kindergarten 0.20 0.01* 0.38 0.12 0.90
First Grade 0.89 0.20 0.06† 0.19 0.91
Second Grade 0.21 0.39 0.77 0.59 0.29
Later Grades
Fourth Grade 0.41 0.88 0.05* 0.94 0.56
Eighth Grade 0.22 0.48 0.51 0.47 0.44
High School 0.54 0.50 0.21 0.22 0.17
B. Assigned to Aide
Project STAR
Kindergarten 0.10 0.04* 0.24 0.66 0.88
First Grade 0.04* 0.17 0.76 0.20 0.12
Second Grade 0.72 0.83 0.72 0.67 0.99
Later Grades
Fourth Grade 0.59 0.36 0.07† 0.45 0.96
Eighth Grade 0.53 0.75 0.61 0.26 0.54
High School 0.82 0.40 0.44 0.29 0.16
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Ordinary least squares models with robust standard
errors clustered at the school level. Sample size in panel A ranges from 5,902 to 6,833 and in later
grades ranges from 10,854 to 10,988.
Project STAR data and follow-up surveys, Authors’ calculations.
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students originally assigned to small-class treatment, whereas panel B shows the results
for students originally assigned to aide treatment. We also distinguish between differential
attrition during STAR and differential attrition from follow-up surveys (i.e., fourth grade,
eighth grade, and high school).
In general, we find little evidence of nonrandom attrition, at least for the variables we
have. Most importantly, we find no evidence of differential attrition in terms of achieve-
ment (column 5) and free-lunch eligibility (column 4), suggesting that high-achievers and
children from high-income families were not more likely to leave the samples, compared
to low-achievers and children from low-income families respectively. This is important
because if high-income families (or families of high achieving pupils) were more likely to
withdraw their children from school when such children are assigned to a regular class,
we would overestimate the effect of the treatments.
For the other variables, some sporadic difference is significant at the five-percent level
for girls in the “aide” treatment (in first grade), black students for both “small” and “aide”
(in kindergarten), and age in the “small” treatment (in fourth grade). Although these
attrition patterns are not present in all the grades, they may cause some problems to the
interpretation of our findings if the analytic sample varies significantly from the original—
and representative—sample. Given that we find no persistent pattern of nonrandom
attrition across all samples, we are confident that this is not the case. Nonetheless,
in appendix Table 2.7.3 we adjust for nonrandom attrition by imputing test scores for
students who exited the samples. We imply a worst-case scenario, which consists of
predicting the scores of pupils who left the control group as if they received the treatment
Small. Conversely, we predict for pupils who left one of the treatment groups as if
they received no treatment. This imputation technique should lead to an increase in
average achievement for the control group and, at the same time, a decrease in average
achievement for the treatment groups.
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2.4 Econometric Models
In this section, we first introduce the education production function that describes the
relationship between class size and student achievement. Second, we specify the regression
equation we use to estimate the production function of our interest. Third, we describe
in detail the econometric method we use to identify the effect of class size across the
achievement distribution.
2.4.1 The Education Production Function
To understand the effect of student-to-teacher ratio on achievement and underline the
advantages of a randomized experiment for causal inference, we focus on the following
education production function (Krueger, 1999; Todd and Wolpin, 2003):
Yij = f(Sij, Fij, Rij) (2.4.1)
where Yij is the achievement level of student i in school j, Sij is a vector of student
characteristics, Fij is a vector representing the family background of student i, and Rij
is a vector containing school resources and characteristics. If we assume the production
function to be linear and separable, we can rewrite equation (2.4.1) as follows:
Yij = a · Sij + b · Fij + c ·Rij + εij (2.4.2)
where εij is the stochastic error component. In principle, Sij, Fij, and Rij include infor-
mation and experiences that students have been accumulating over their lives. Typical
observable characteristics of Sij are, for example, gender and age. In Fij we have variables
such as socio-demographic status and family structure. Finally, Rij contains information
such as classroom size and teacher qualifications for each year the child attended school.
Additionally, student unobserved ability also contributes to the achievement level
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(Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998). Consequently, in any non-experimental application re-
searchers generally lack data on some relevant school, family, or student characteristics—
whether observed or not. These omitted variables will then appear in the error term, and
if the omitted variables are correlated with the included variables, then the estimated
parameters will be biased. However, if a given characteristic (e.g., class size) is deter-
mined by random assignment, it will be independent of the omitted variables. Thus,
with random assignment, a simple comparison of achievement between students in small
and large classes, or between classes with aide and regular classes, provides an unbiased
estimate of the effect of the student-to-teacher ratio on achievement.
We analyze the STAR data by estimating the following regression equation for stu-
dents in kindergarten and first grade:9
Yics = β0 + β1 · Smallcs + β2 · Aidecs +X ′icsβ3 + Z ′csβ4 + αs + εics (2.4.3)
where Yics is the average percentile score on the SAT test of student i in class c at school s,
Smallcs is a dummy variable indicating whether the student was assigned to a small class
that year, Aidecs is a dummy variable indicating whether the student was assigned to a
regular-size class with an aide that year, Xics is a vector of observed student covariates
(gender, age, ethnicity, and free-lunch eligibility), and Zcs is a vector of observed teacher
covariates (gender, ethnicity, years of experience, and qualifications). Given that the
randomization was done within schools, we also include school fixed effects (αs). Adding
school fixed effects ensures the independence between treatment assignment and other
variables.
The coefficients of interest are β1 and β2. They represent the causal effect of being
assigned to a small-size or regular-size with aide class on the percentile score of the SAT
test.10 Given that the dependent variable is expressed in percentile ranks, we interpret the
9Results for second and third grade show similar patterns (regression outputs are available upon
request).
10In the literature, such effects are referred as “reduced-form” effects or “intention-to-treat” effects
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effect size of β1 and β2 as a percentage point change in the distribution of achievement.
2.4.2 Estimation of Distributional Effects
Given that we expect the effect of pupil-to-teacher ratio to differ across the achievement
distribution, our goal is to go beyond the average effects and study the impact on the
overall distribution. In the early 2000s, new methods for estimating counterfactual distri-
butions emerged (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2013; Fortin et al., 2011; Melly, 2006). The
approach that we use, proposed by Firpo et al. (2009), is called unconditional quantile
regression.
Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux’s estimator allows for a direct measure of how a marginal
change in the level of one variable (in our case, the treatment dummy) affects the distri-
bution of achievement in the population, keeping the distribution of other characteristics
equal. Unconditional quantile regression differs from the commonly used (conditional)
quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker and Hallock, 2001). Conditional
quantile regression estimates treatment effects conditional on the mean value of included
covariates, and the interpretation of such treatment effects change when different sets of
covariates are entered into the regression equation. Consequently, the interpretation of
effects is limited when the effects for different conditional quantiles vary—e.g., changes
in estimated treatment effects may be attributable to either improved identification or
estimation of a different relationship. In such cases, the estimated effects do not trans-
late to relevant policy questions that are linked to the covariates of interest (Borah and
Basu, 2013). In contrast, unconditional quantile regression can be used for overcoming
the limitations of the conditional quantile regression approach.
A simple example adapted from Fro¨lich and Melly (2010) illustrates this advantage.
As in our Project STAR setting, assume that the treatment has been completely random-
ized and is thus independent of both potential outcomes and other covariates. In such a
(Krueger, 1999).
26
CHAPTER 2. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CLASS SIZE AND TEACHER AIDE
situation, a comparison of the distribution of the outcome in the treated and non-treated
populations has a causal interpretation. However, either for efficiency or because of block
randomization, we may wish to include covariates or fixed effects in the estimation. If
we are interested in mean effects, it is well known that including covariates that are in-
dependent of the treatment in a linear regression leaves the estimated treatment effect
unchanged. This property is lost for quantile treatment effects: Including covariates that
are independent of the treatment changes the limit of the estimated conditional quantile
treatment effect. However, including those covariates does not change the unconditional
treatment effect, as long as the exogeneity assumptions of the model are satisfied (which
are indeed in our randomized setting).
Additionally, because a conditional quantile is the relative position of an individual
among a (virtual) population of individuals that share precisely the same observed char-
acteristics, conditional quantile regression yields only the within-group effect, whereas
unconditional quantile regression estimates the total effect, i.e., the sum of the between-
group and within-group effects (Fournier and Koske, 2013). This means that uncondi-
tional quantile regression allows to compare estimated effects at different quantiles with
each other, whereas ordinary quantile regression does not allow for such comparison.
The unconditional quantile regression consists of running a regression of a relatively
simple transformation—the re-centered influence function—of the outcome variable on
the explanatory variables. Because of its policy relevant interpretation and its computa-
tional attractiveness, unconditional quantile regression has been used in several studies
on quantile effects (Maclean et al., 2014; Mu¨ller, 2015; Stueber and Beissinger, 2012),
decomposition analyses (Heywood and Parent, 2012; Sakellariou, 2012; Tang and Long,
2013), and regression-discontinuity designs (Frandsen, 2012).
To understand the unconditional quantile regression method, let Y denote the out-
come of interest (e.g., test score) and FY (y) denote the cumulative distribution function of
Y in a target population. Empirical researchers are often interested in exploring the effect
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of a binary treatment D on Y , and denote the potential outcomes and their distribution
function under alternate values of D as Y0 and Y1. Thus we have Y = (1−D) ·Y0 +D ·Y1.
As Borah and Basu (2013) show, we can express the unconditional distribution function
for Y as a weighted average of conditional distribution of Y given D, weighted by the
unconditional distribution of D:11
FY (y) = Pr(D = 1) · FY |D(y|D = 1) + Pr(D = 0) · FY |D(y|D = 0) (2.4.4)
In most regression models that study the relationship between Y andD, the focus is on the
conditional expectation of Y , i.e., E(Y |D) = ∫ dF (Y |D). In the traditional linear model,
ordinary least squares (OLS) is a consistent estimator of the target parameter representing
the effect of D on Y , which is simply the difference in the conditional expectation of Y for
D = 0 and D = 1: βols = E(Y |D = 1)− E(Y |D = 0). For OLS, βols is also a consistent
estimator for this marginal effect on the unconditional distribution of Y :
E(Y ) = p(D) · E(Y |D = 1) + [1− p(D)] · E(Y |D = 0)
dE(Y )/dp(D) = E(Y |D = 1)− E(Y |D = 0) = βols
(2.4.5)
This duality of interpretation of βols persists—under regularity conditions—even when
we add other covariates to the model.
As with OLS, the definition of the effect on the unconditional quantile does not
change with the set of covariates available for conditioning: Even in the presence of a vec-
tor of covariates, the effect on the unconditional quantile is always evaluated marginally
over the distribution of such covariates. Without any other covariates correlated with the
outcome, the conditional and the unconditional treatment effects of a treatment variable
D are identical for any quantile of Y (Fro¨lich and Melly, 2010). However, when the data-
11In statistics, the unconditional distribution of a random variable is referred to as the marginal
distribution of that variable. However, because we use the term “marginal” to represent small changes
in covariate values (marginal effects), we use the term “unconditional distribution” as in Firpo et al.
(2009).
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generating process allows for the effects to vary over the values of other covariates, the
definition of the unconditional quantile treatment effect—as well as the interpretation of
such effects—is different from the definition of the conditional quantile treatment effect,
because the latter varies with the set of covariates included (Maclean et al., 2014).
For clarity, we follow Borah and Basu (2013) and consider the relationship of D
with the quantiles of the distribution of Y . Letting qY (τ) denote the τ
th quantile of the
unconditional distribution of Y 12 and following equation (2.4.4) we have that:
FY [qY (τ)] = Pr(D = 1) · FY |D=1[qY (τ)] + Pr(D = 0) · FY |D=0[qY (τ)] (2.4.6)
The unconditional quantile treatment effect is obtained by the differentiation of (2.4.6):13
dqY (τ)/dp(D) = [FY |D=1(qY (τ))− FY |D=0(qY (τ))]/fY (qτ ) (2.4.7)
From Koenker and Hallock (2001), we know that the coefficient on a binary variable D
from a conditional quantile regression that includes a vector of covariates X is:
βcqr(τ) = FY |D=1,X=x¯(τ)− FY |D=0,X=x¯(τ) (2.4.8)
where x¯ represents a vector of sample means for X. βcqr(τ) is a consistent estimator for
the conditional effect of D evaluated at the mean values of X, but it is not a consistent
estimator of the unconditional effect of D as defined in equation (2.4.7). This result
is due to the fact that dqY (τ)/dp(D) 6= βcqr(τ).14 For example, the 90th percentile of
the unconditional distribution of Y may not be the same as the 90th percentile on the
conditional distribution of Y |D,X.
To provide practitioners with a way to compute dqY (τ)/dp(D), the literature has
developed several approaches, from non-parametric estimators (Firpo, 2007) to propensity
12τ = FY [qY (τ)]
13See Firpo et al. (2009).
14Alternatively, FY |D=1,X=x¯(τ) = qY |D=1,X=x¯(τ) 6= qY (τ).
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score matching (Fro¨lich, 2007) and decomposition methods (Machado and Mata, 2005).
The most recent approach—the one we use in this chapter—was proposed by Firpo et al.
(2009), who suggest a unconditional quantile regression model based on the concept of
re-centered influence function, commonly used in robust statistics (Hampel et al., 2011).
An influence function is an analytic tool assessing the effect of removing or adding
an observation on the value of a certain statistic v(F ), without having to recalculate that
statistic. The influence function is defined as follows:
IF [y, v(F )] = lim
h→0
v[(1− h) · F + h · δy]− v(F )
h
, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 (2.4.9)
where F represent the cumulative distribution function for Y , and δy is a distribution
that puts mass at the value y. We obtain the re-centered influence function (RIF) by
adding the statistics of interest to its influence function:
RIF (y, v) = v(F ) + IF (y, v) (2.4.10)
If the statistic of interest is a specific quantile τ of the distribution of the outcome of
interest, we have:
IF [y, v(F )] = (τ − I[Y ≤ qτ ])/fY (qτ ) (2.4.11)
where qτ is the τ
th quantile of the unconditional distribution of Y , fY (qτ ) is the probability
density function of Y evaluated at qτ , and I[Y ≤ qτ ] indicates whether an outcome value
is less than the specified quantile qτ . In the case of quantiles, the re-centered influence
function is then:
RIF (y, qτ ) = qτ + IF (y, qτ ) (2.4.12)
Firpo et al. (2009) show that when the conditional expectation of RIF (y, qτ ) is modeled
as a function of explanatory variables, a RIF regression can be viewed as an unconditional
quantile regression.15
15This is because, as EXE[RIF (Y, τ)|x] = qτ by the definition of RIF, Firpo et al. (2009) demonstrate
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In the class size experiment context, relying on unconditional quantile regressions—
rather than ordinary quantile regressions—provides researchers and policymakers with
additional information. For example, we might be interested in studying the impact of
teacher or student characteristics on achievement and how class size effects are moderated
by such variables. This is only possible with unconditional quantile regression methods,
because including covariates leaves the treatment effect unchanged. This property also
exists in ordinary least squares models, but it is lost for conventional quantile regression
methods. Another example concerns the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. The
class size effect estimated by conventional quantile regression methods only shows the
within-group variation of the effects. This means that the coefficient indicates, for each
quantile, how much variation there is in the class size effect among a group with the same
student and teacher characteristics. From a policy perspective this is not informative,
because we would be more interested in the total effect, i.e., the within and between vari-
ation. This is only possible with unconditional quantile regression methods. Therefore,
unconditional quantile regression is not only more suitable to answer policy questions but
it also allows comparing estimated effects at different quintiles with each other.
The implementation of the unconditional quantile regression, is a computationally
attractive two-step procedure.16 For a specific quantile τ , we first have to estimate the RIF
of the τ th quantile of Y following (2.4.11) and (2.4.12). We calculate qτ using the sample
estimate of the unconditional τ th quantile of Y . Similarly, we estimate the density fY (qτ )
at qτ using kernel methods. The second step is to run an OLS regression of the RIF (y, qτ )
on the treatment variables and other observed covariates. In this two-step procedure, the
unconditional quantile partial effects are simply the estimated coefficients.17
that EX [dmτ (x)/dX] is the marginal effect of a covariate on the τ
th unconditional quantile of Y , ceteris
paribus.
16See Firpo et al. (2009) for the detailed procedure and alternative approaches.
17To compute the unconditional quantile treatment effects, we use the Stata routine rifreg, available
at http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html
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2.5 Results
This section presents our results in two parts. The first part shows the results for student
test scores using the unconditional quantile regression. Given that the distributional in-
vestigation constitutes the core of this chapter, we present detailed regression outputs
and sub-sample analysis, both supported by graphical evidence. The second part exam-
ines class-size effects in later grades. We focus on fourth grade, eighth grade, and high
school.18
2.5.1 Distributional Effects During Project STAR
Table 2.5.1 presents the unconditional treatment effects of smaller classes (i.e., Small)
and classes with a teacher’s aide (i.e., Aide) on achievement in kindergarten and first
grade. We gradually add pupil and teacher covariates to our regression equations, and
although doing so does not largely alter the effect size, pupil and teacher characteristics
are jointly significant. Thus our preferred estimates are those in column 3 for kindergarten
and in column 6 for first grade.
A look at the coefficients of Small in Table 2.5.1 reveals that being assigned to a small
class has positive effects on test scores throughout the entire achievement distribution
(p = 0.00). However, there is a high degree of heterogeneity in the effects. At the bottom
decile of the distribution, students assigned to smaller classes score 2.5 percentage points
higher than those assigned to regular-size classes in kindergarten. In first grade, bottom-
decile students assigned to smaller classes score 4.5 percentage points higher than those
assigned to regular-size classes. The effect is larger at the median, reaching 7.7 percentage
points in kindergarten and 8.5 percentage points in first grade. Then the effect of Small
declines in the upper part of the achievement distribution, down to 5-6 percentage points.
Then the effect of Small declines in the upper part of the achievement distribution, down
18Results for fifth, sixth, and seventh grade—which are very similar to those of fourth and eighth—are
available upon request.
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Figure 2.5.1: Distributional Effect of Small Class, Kindergarten
to 5-6 percentage points.
In Figures 2.5.1 and Figure 2.5.2, we compute the unconditional quantile treatment
effect of Small for each percentile of the achievement distribution, along with the re-
spective 90-percent confidence intervals. Both figures further highlight the heterogeneous
effect of being assigned to a small class. It shows that the mean effect—the continuous
red line—is a poor representation of the small-class effect. Mid-achievers (fourth to eighth
decile) profit the most from being assigned to a small class. Pupils at the bottom and at
the top of the achievement distribution experience only a little from being in a smaller
class.
Table 2.5.1 also presents unconditional quantile treatment effects for the treatment
condition Aide. Consistent with previous studies, we find no effect on test score at the
median. However, low achievers actually benefit from aide-teachers. For pupils at the
bottom of the achievement distribution, we estimate a positive and highly significant
effect of Aide. The effect size is roughly 2.5 percentage points on the percentile rank
score, an effect as large as that of being in a small class in kindergarten. To emphasize
the importance of Aide, figures 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 present unconditional quantile treatment
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Table 2.5.1: Class Size Effects in Kindergarten and First Grade
Percentile Rank Score
Kindergarten First Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantile .10
Small class 2.423** 2.349** 2.476** 5.179** 4.679** 4.476**
(0.856) (0.849) (0.843) (0.899) (0.891) (0.898)
Aide class 2.266** 2.346** 2.462** 2.532** 2.595** 2.323**
(0.832) (0.823) (0.824) (0.913) (0.904) (0.900)
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.116 0.117 0.082 0.099 0.101
Quantile .25
Small class 4.083** 3.899** 3.992** 9.372** 8.358** 7.603**
(1.132) (1.108) (1.109) (1.168) (1.145) (1.165)
Aide class 1.326 1.485 1.353 2.581* 2.637* 1.743
(1.100) (1.073) (1.076) (1.171) (1.147) (1.159)
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.197 0.199 0.143 0.179 0.182
Quantile .50
Small class 7.770** 7.536** 7.700** 10.528** 9.171** 8.487**
(1.348) (1.300) (1.307) (1.255) (1.218) (1.238)
Aide class -1.070 -0.845 -0.864 2.502* 2.552* 1.823
(1.291) (1.249) (1.263) (1.206) (1.172) (1.192)
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.217 0.218 0.164 0.215 0.216
Quantile .75
Small class 7.760** 7.521** 7.510** 9.217** 8.230** 7.820**
(1.224) (1.193) (1.203) (1.170) (1.143) (1.151)
Aide class -0.007 0.145 -0.153 1.484 1.519 1.101
(1.124) (1.095) (1.107) (1.091) (1.061) (1.083)
Adjusted R2 0.143 0.184 0.185 0.132 0.176 0.178
Quantile .90
Small class 5.167** 5.034** 5.121** 6.456** 5.986** 5.949**
(1.136) (1.118) (1.126) (0.941) (0.929) (0.931)
Aide class -0.967 -0.867 -0.949 0.303 0.316 0.306
(0.973) (0.957) (0.973) (0.809) (0.796) (0.817)
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.110 0.110 0.081 0.107 0.107
School fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Student covariates YES YES YES YES
Teacher covariates YES YES
N 5,837 5,837 5,837 6,449 6,449 6,449
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Student
covariates include gender, age, age squared, ethnicity, and free-lunch eligibility. Teacher covariates
include gender, ethnicity, years of experience, experience squared, and qualifications.
Project STAR data, Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 2.5.2: Distributional Effect of Small Class, First Grade
effect at each percentile of the achievement distribution.
In kindergarten (figure 2.5.3), being assigned to a regular class with an aide clearly
has a positive effect on test score for low-achieving students. The effect is highly sig-
nificant for the first two deciles of the achievement distribution and ranges between 2-3
percentage points. For the rest of the distribution, the treatment condition Aide has no
impact on test scores. In first grade (figure 2.5.4), the effect of Aide is irregular and im-
precisely estimated. The reason has to do with the experimental design (Krueger, 1999).
After one year of Project STAR (i.e., kindergarten), a first assessment of the treatment
Aide revealed no significant effect on test scores (at the mean). Therefore, the exper-
imental committee decided to re-randomize pupils who were originally assigned to one
of the treatments in a regular-size class. This re-randomization makes it impossible for
researchers to know precisely which treatment the pupils in regular classes experienced.
Therefore, most studies of Project STAR do not even analyze the effects of being assigned
to Aide; instead, they usually pool Aide with the control group. Despite this experimen-
tal flaw, we can investigate the impact of Aide at least in kindergarten, allowing us to
reveal positive effects for low achievers. The benefits of Aide are present in first grade,
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Figure 2.5.3: Distributional Effect of Aide, Kindergarten
too, but they are less clear and less precisely estimated.
To further assess whether the effects of Small and Aide are beneficial for disad-
vantaged pupils, we estimate unconditional quantile treatment effects for black and for
free-lunch eligible children. We also conduct a separate analysis for boys, because the
literature from education economics and psychology shows that boys tend to be more dis-
ruptive (Bertrand and Pan, 2013) and are more likely to lose their concentration during
instructional time (Feingold, 1994).19
Table 2.5.2 presents the sub-sample analysis for both kindergarten and first grade
outcomes. A smaller class has larger effects for boys, black children, and free-lunch eligible
children. This is consistent with previous studies that focus on average effects, but our
analysis also underlines a high level of heterogeneity in the effect of Small. The inverted
u-shaped pattern over the percentiles of the achievement distribution persists, but now the
effect drops only at the top decile (instead of the top quintile). Similarly, being assigned
to a regular class with a teacher’s aide is very beneficial for boys and disadvantaged
19We also performed the analysis for white pupils and girls. We do not report the results here, because
they are very similar to the estimates using the full sample (slightly smaller effect sizes). However, results
are available upon request.
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Figure 2.5.4: Distributional Effect of Aide, First Grade
children. The treatment Aide has a strong positive impact on low-achievers’ test scores
and such effect is significant almost for half of the achievement distribution.
Figures 2.5.5 provides graphical evidence of the effect of Small and Aide for boys,
black children, and free-lunch eligible children. We restrict the analysis to kindergarten
not only for the sake of comprehension but also to focus on the outcomes that were
measured before the re-randomization. Comparing the effect of Aide for the sub-samples
to the one of the entire sample, we observe two phenomena. First, the effect is larger in
terms of magnitude; and, second, the effect is significant up to the fourth decile (whereas
for the full sample it is significant only for the bottom two deciles).
We might suspect that the distributional results we obtain depend on how we spec-
ified the outcome variable, i.e., in percentile ranks. However, specifying the dependent
variable in z-scores (standard deviations) does not affect the results, as we show in ap-
pendix Table 2.7.3. As a further robustness check, in appendix Table 2.7.3 we adjust for
nonrandom attrition by imputing test scores for students who left the sample. We predict
the scores of pupils who left the control group as if they received the treatment Small.
Conversely, we predict for pupils who left one of the treatment groups as if they received
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Table 2.5.2: Class Size Effects in Kindergarten and First Grade, Sub-sample
Percentile Rank Score
Kindergarten First Grade
Black Free-lunch Boys Black Free-lunch Boys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quantile .10
Small class 3.680** 3.267** 2.093† 4.335** 3.327** 3.975**
(1.249) (1.001) (1.136) (1.031) (0.917) (1.182)
Aide class 3.543** 3.191** 4.045** 1.353 1.406 2.463*
(1.192) (0.977) (1.081) (1.166) (0.929) (1.143)
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.072 0.125 0.060 0.043 0.083
Quantile .25
Small class 6.552** 5.563** 5.042** 7.454** 6.673** 7.401**
(1.561) (1.274) (1.414) (1.410) (1.268) (1.652)
Aide class 3.387* 3.798** 4.930** 2.620† 3.331** 3.145*
(1.495) (1.259) (1.356) (1.511) (1.252) (1.601)
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.136 0.191 0.134 0.103 0.166
Quantile .50
Small class 8.377** 7.050** 9.700** 10.518** 8.461** 6.650**
(2.473) (1.903) (1.820) (1.866) (1.631) (1.711)
Aide class -2.290 -0.657 3.090† -1.083 1.429 1.551
(2.252) (1.799) (1.754) (1.858) (1.514) (1.620)
Adjusted R2 0.218 0.182 0.211 0.167 0.150 0.207
Quantile .75
Small class 8.824** 7.850** 9.772** 11.656** 7.352** 8.504**
(2.693) (2.083) (1.830) (2.454) (1.831) (1.679)
Aide class -1.549 -1.111 0.559 -1.211 1.865 0.728
(2.301) (1.884) (1.682) (2.210) (1.668) (1.580)
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.180 0.182 0.151 0.139 0.187
Quantile .90
Small class 7.568** 7.094** 9.525** 9.757** 5.927** 5.718**
(2.583) (2.085) (1.716) (2.470) (1.968) (1.406)
Aide class 1.676 0.816 1.531 -2.516 0.514 0.051
(2.177) (1.770) (1.450) (2.009) (1.739) (1.215)
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.126 0.128 0.097 0.094 0.114
School fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Student covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES
Teacher covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 1,897 2,823 2,991 2,143 3,289 3,338
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Student covariates
include gender, age, age squared, ethnicity, and free-lunch eligibility. Teacher covariates include gender,
ethnicity, years of experience, experience squared, and qualifications.
Project STAR data, Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 2.5.5: Distributional Effect of Small and Aide on Test Scores, Sub-Samples
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no treatment. Doing so reduces the estimated treatment effects—as expected—but does
not entirely wipe out either the small-class effect or the aide-class effect.
Given the heterogeneity we observe in the data for both Small and Aide, we need
to explain the mechanism behind our results. Understanding why high achievers benefit
less from a small class compared to the mid-achievers is somehow intuitive. Being a
high achiever usually correlates with both higher motivation and higher socioeconomic
status (Heckman and Masterov, 2007). Children with such characteristics would probably
perform well regardless of the treatment they receive, or at least they would benefit less
compared to those students who lack of either resources or motivation.
Understanding why low achievers benefit less from being in smaller classes, instead,
might be less intuitive. Theory would suggest that in small classes teachers are more
able to identify low achievers and thus more likely to provide instruction designed to
benefit these students (Konstantopoulos, 2008). However, such practice is difficult to
implement when there is only one teacher in the classroom, because he or she would need
to focus only on a group of children, leaving the majority of the class without supervision.
Therefore, teachers in smaller classes probably use their additional capacity to help the
majority to improve.
By contrast, when the teachers are two as in the Aide treatment, teachers are not
only likely to identify low achievers but also able to provide targeted instruction to benefit
such students. This might explain the positive impact of being in a class with an extra
teacher for those pupils who need more help or support. This result has an important
policy implication: Not only the treatment Aide actually has an impact on low-achievers’
test scores but such effect is also stronger for boys and disadvantaged children. Therefore,
for low-achieving classes it might be beneficial to hire an extra professional to provide
in-class aide.
An alternative explanation for the minimal effect of Small among low achievers
might come from empirical observation. An unfortunate recurrence in many interventions
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that aim at low achievers is that such interventions obtain only scarce or partial success
(Betts and Shkolnik, 2000; Jacob and Lefgren, 2009; Lefgren, 2004), probably because
low achievers and their families are less responsive to treatments in general. However,
the fact that low achievers benefit most from the treatment Aide suggests that this latter
explanation cannot be the entire story, at least in our case.
2.5.2 Effects in Later Grades and High School
In later grades we cannot perform the same distributional analysis as in the STAR years,
because assuming rank preservation in the achievement distribution between kindergarten
and fourth grade or eighth grade is likely too stringent. We nevertheless want to investi-
gate whether class-size effects are different for low, mid-, and high achievers. To do so,
we add an indicator of whether a student was a bottom, middle, or top achiever during
the STAR years, and we then interact the indicator with the treatment dummies. Unfor-
tunately, in later grades we do not have information about teacher characteristics, partly
because students have different teachers for several subjects (especially in high school).
Table 2.5.3 presents the class size effects on fourth and eighth grade. In columns
1 and 3 we see that being in a smaller class during Project STAR has a positive effect
in later grades. The effect size is 2.7 percentage points in fourth grade, and declines
until 2.2 at the end of eighth grade. Krueger and Whitmore (2001) and Schanzenbach
(2006) also report similar decreasing effects, whereas Nye et al. (1999) estimate no fading
between third grade and eighth grade. The difference in the results is probably due to
different econometric approaches, but none of the studies investigate whether the effects
differ among low, mid-, or high achievers.
Columns 2 and 4 show the regression outputs for the models that include interac-
tion terms between treatment conditions and achievement dummies. Three findings are
relevant in this analysis. First, being a mid- or high achiever during Project STAR has
a huge impact on later grades test scores, compared to low achievers. The effect size is
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Table 2.5.3: Class Size Effects in Fourth and Eighth Grades
Percentile Rank Score
Fourth Grade Eighth Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Small class 2.737* -3.867** 2.170* -3.140*
(1.174) (1.142) (1.036) (1.328)
Aide class -0.058 -1.376 0.142 -1.150
(1.001) (1.071) (0.927) (1.275)
Mid-achiever 23.763** 17.348**
(1.593) (1.600)
High achiever 45.973** 36.165**
(1.73) (1.405)
Small*Mid-achiever -0.454 -0.717
(2.022) (1.852)
Small*High achiever 3.967* 3.887*
(1.929) (1.798)
Aide*Mid-achiever -2.054 -0.836
(1.758) (2.060)
Aide*High achiever 2.133 2.000
(1.652) (1.570)
School fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Student covariates YES YES YES YES
(Adjusted) R2 0.280 0.645 0.308 0.543
N 4,043 4,043 5,056 5,056
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Ordinary least squares models
with robust standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses
Student covariates include gender, age, age squared, ethnicity, and free-
lunch eligibility.
Project STAR data and follow-up surveys, Authors’ calculations.
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around 20 percentage points for mid-achievers and it doubles for high achievers. Second,
the only significant coefficient among all interactions is the one on Small*High achiever
(p < 0.05), suggesting that all the benefits of being assigned to a smaller class in later
grades comes from high-achieving students. High achievers benefited less from smaller
classes during STAR compared to mid-achievers, however high achievers experience much
less fading in later grades. Third, we find no significant effect for either Aide or any inter-
action between Aide and the achievement dummies. This might seem disappointing, but
it might be due to the fact that we have accurate information about the Aide treatment
only for kindergarten. Moreover, in later years, the confidence bounds of the interaction
terms are large, suggesting that we might lack of statistical power to achieve significance.
We conduct a similar analysis for high school, using on-time graduation and AC-
T/SAT exam-taking as outcomes. Both outcomes are coded as binary variables, and
Table 2.5.4 summarizes the results. We find that both Small and Aide have a positive
and marginally significant effect on high school graduation (p < 0.10), and effect of 2.9
percentage points for Small and 2.3 percentage points for Aide. The effects are not mod-
erated by any of the achievement dummies, as we see in column 2. However, we observe
that including the interactions we lose precision in estimating the coefficients. This might
be due either to a lack of statistical power or to a high correlation between the treatment
variables and the achievement dummies.
Regarding ACT/SAT exam-taking, we confirm the findings of Krueger and Whitmore
(2001), i.e., that being assigned to smaller classes in early grades increases the likelihood of
taking a college entrance exam. Moreover, we additionally find a positive and significant
effect of Aide, which constitutes a relevant extension to Krueger’s work. Both coefficients
are highly significant (p < 0.01), with a magnitude of roughly 5 percentage points. The
interaction between Small and High achiever is marginally significant (p < 0.10), which
might imply that—once again—the effect of Small is more persistent for high-achieving
students, compared to low and mid-achievers. Compared to test scores results, it appears
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Table 2.5.4: Class Size Effects in High School
Graduated from Took ACT/SAT
High School in High School
Dummy=1 if Yes Dummy=1 if Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Small class 0.029† 0.046 0.051** -0.012
(0.015) (0.032) (0.013) (0.016)
Aide class 0.023† 0.025 0.044** 0.029*
(0.013) (0.023) (0.011) (0.013)
Mid-achiever 0.115** 0.174**
(0.033) (0.021)
High achiever 0.142** 0.373**
(0.028) (0.019)
Small*Mid-achiever -0.071 0.030
(0.046) (0.030)
Small*High achiever -0.026 0.052†
(0.044) (0.027)
Aide*Mid-achiever -0.023 -0.004
(0.037) (0.021)
Aide*High achiever -0.009 0.011
(0.033) (0.023)
School fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Student covariates YES YES YES YES
(Adjusted) R2 0.158 0.171 0.156 0.247
N 4,667 4,667 10,335 10,335
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Ordinary least squares models
with robust standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses
Student covariates include gender, age, age squared, ethnicity, and free-
lunch eligibility.
Project STAR data and follow-up surveys, Authors’ calculations.
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that Aide helps complete high school on time but does not necessarily improve test scores.
This is consistent with previous findings on college entrance exam-taking behavior, which
indicates that class size increases the probability of taking an ACT or SAT exam but not
the result of the test itself Krueger and Whitmore (2001).
2.6 Conclusions and Discussion
Using data from Tennessee’s Project STAR and follow-up surveys, we provide experimen-
tal evidence of heterogeneous effects of class size and teacher’s aide over the achievement
distribution. Our results contribute to the literature on class size in at least four ways.
First, we show that, given the large amount of heterogeneity in the treatment effects,
mean regression provides only a poor description of the underlying relationship between
class size and achievement. Similarly, not even standard sub-sample analysis is a suf-
ficient tool for studying heterogeneity and heterogeneity patterns over the achievement
distribution.
Second, we find that mid-achieving students gain the most from being assigned to
a small class, whereas students at the bottom and top of the achievement distribution
experience only minimal gains. Although this result differs from what those few studies
that investigate the distributional effects of class size suggest, we use a richer econometric
approach (i.e., unconditional quantile regression), and our findings are robust across
alternative specifications and estimation techniques.
Third, we report—for the first time—positive and significant effects of a regular-size
class with an aide for the low-achieving pupils. Not only is the effect significant for the
first two deciles of the achievement distribution, but it is even stronger for boys and
disadvantaged children. Interestingly, the effect size of Aide is as large as that of Small
for the bottom third of the achievement distribution. In terms of equity, while the net
effect of Small on the achievement gap is not clear, our estimates show that adding a
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teacher’s aide would be an effective policy for reducing the achievement gap, especially
for classes with large percentages of boys, black students, or low-income students.
Fourth, our results confirm that average effects on test scores in later grades, on-
time high school graduation, and college exam-taking are relatively weak and short-lived.
However, we are able to show in addition that the effects in later grades remain strong for
Project STAR high achievers, whereas they vanish completely for low- and mid-achieving
pupils. This result helps resolving the (empirical) debate on the existence of long-term
effect of class size, because it clearly shows that the effect depends on the individual’s
position in the achievement distribution. For high achievers, even though the positive
effect of smaller classes is initially lower than that for mid-achievers in early grades, these
benefits persist over time.
Our analyses have some limitations.20 We acknowledge two potential methodological
improvements and one potential conceptual advancement. Methodologically, we estimate
a reduced-form effect, not the treatment effect on the treated. One way of obtaining that
treatment effect would be instrumenting the class size that an individual actually experi-
enced with his or her initial assignment. However, the unconditional quantile regression
estimator of Firpo et al. (2009) applies only to models with no endogenous regressors.
Another issue related to the econometric approach we use are the standard errors. The
optimal strategy, given the data structure, would be computing robust standard errors
clustered at the school level. However, as our approach does not allow clustering, we com-
pute robust standard errors. Future research could attempt to apply block-bootstrapping
methods (Cameron et al., 2008).
Conceptually, several researchers argue that test scores are not the most relevant
outcome in education production functions. For example Heckman et al. (2013) stress
20We skip the discussion on data limitations, as it is already been discussed extensively (Hanushek,
1998, 1999). The main limitation of the Project STAR data is that baseline test scores are not available.
Thus testing that the treatment and control groups were similar in terms of their achievement distri-
butions before the experiment began is not possible. However, the random assignment should ensure
equivalence before the intervention. In our analyses we find no worrisome observable differences between
the groups.
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the importance of non-cognitive skills, which have a significant impact on labor market
outcomes. Similarly, studies by Duckworth et al.,21 emphasize the role of perseverance
and passion for long-term goal on education and labor market success. Given that follow-
up surveys of Project STAR contain enough information to build a “grit score,” future
research might explore this avenue in more detail.
This chapter shows that typical estimates of the mean gain from class size and
teacher’s aide provide an incomplete characterization of their real impact on achievement
distribution, thus constituting a weak guide for public educational policy. While smaller
classes have the largest impact on mid-achievers, having an in-class teacher’s aide consti-
tutes an effective measure for raising the test scores of low achievers. Similarly, while a
teacher’s aide appears to have no impact on test scores at the mean, having a teacher’s
aide is extremely useful for low-achieving pupils. We conclude that policymakers, when
designing educational reforms, need to think carefully about the goals and the impact
that an intervention has on different parts of the achievement distribution, rather than
its impact on the mean achiever.
21See for example Duckworth et al. (2007) and Eskreis-Winkler et al. (2014).
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Descriptive Statistics over the Achievement Distribution
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2.7.2 Robustness Checks
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Table 2.7.3: Robustness Checks, z-scores and imputed scores
Z-Scores (standard deviations) Imputed Test Scores
Kindergarten First grade Kindergarten First grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantile .10
Small class 0.110** 0.285** 2.604** 2.693**
(0.037) (0.063) (0.858) (1.019)
Aide class 0.125** 0.130* 2.337** 2.007*
(0.036) (0.062) (0.843) (0.969)
Quantile .25
Small class 0.157** 0.307** 3.439** 6.193**
(0.037) (0.050) (1.068) (1.286)
Aide class 0.063† 0.113* 0.696 2.143†
(0.036) (0.049) (1.048) (1.252)
Quantile .50
Small class 0.251** 0.247** 5.853** 7.767**
(0.041) (0.041) (1.147) (1.337)
Aide class -0.014 0.012 -1.437 2.441†
(0.039) (0.040) (1.108) (1.269)
Quantile .75
Small class 0.312** 0.166** 6.917** 6.798**
(0.047) (0.029) (1.184) (1.200)
Aide class -0.025 0.019 -0.048 1.111
(0.043) (0.027) (1.095) (1.123)
Quantile .90
Small class 0.236** 0.166** 5.581** 5.593**
(0.064) (0.025) (1.141) (0.976)
Aide class -0.086 0.008 -0.735 0.534
(0.055) (0.021) (0.985) (0.854)
School fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Student covariates YES YES YES YES
Teacher covariates YES YES YES YES
N 5,837 6,449 6,253 6,455
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Student
covariates include gender, age, age squared, ethnicity, and free-lunch eligibility. Teacher covariates
include gender, ethnicity, years of experience, experience squared, and qualifications.
Project STAR data, Authors’ calculations.
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Chapter 3
Returns to Education over the Wage
Distribution
[ A version of this paper has been submitted to Labour Economics ]
3.1 Introduction
Although a positive relationship between education and wages is one of the standard
results in economic literature (Dickson and Harmon, 2011), the question of whether ed-
ucation affects individuals differently over the wage distribution is much less analyzed
(Wang, 2013). Moreover, in such distributional settings, the literature has not investi-
gated whether different types of education—vocational or academic—result in differing
returns, or whether one type of education brings a return premium compared to the other
at some point of the wage distribution but not at others. These questions are particu-
larly important because a lack of information about educational types may lead to costly
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decisions for both the individual and the government.
To fill these gaps, in this chapter we first causally estimate the returns to education
over the wage distribution. The analysis reveals potential heterogeneous effects of educa-
tion on wages, answering the question of whether the returns are increasing, decreasing,
or u-shaped across the quantiles.
In a second step, we compare the returns to one extra year of academic education
with the returns to one extra year of vocational education, to investigate whether one
track brings a return premium at any point in the wage distribution. Such a comparison
is lacking in the literature, generally because most countries do not have an extensive
vocational education and training system that allows acquiring the same quality of edu-
cation and the same number of years as in the academic track, or because the academic
track is more prestigious or preferred than the vocational one.1
One notable exception is Switzerland,2 a country with an extensive vocational and
training system that attracts two-thirds of the individuals in every cohort (Tuor and
Backes-Gellner, 2010). The Swiss educational system allows students to achieve tertiary
education degrees for both academic and vocational tracks. Therefore, using Swiss data
allows us to shed light on heterogeneous returns to different types of education keeping
constant the level, and to answer the question of how academic and vocational education
differ over the wage distribution.
The analyses that we propose address two major issues that are common for estima-
tions of returns to education: endogeneity of education attainment (Harmon et al., 2003)
and heterogeneity in the returns to education (Henderson et al., 2011). While theoretical
research considers both issues simultaneously (Arias et al., 2001; Card, 1999), empirical
work often deals with only one issue at a time. To overcome the endogeneity problem,
most scholars use instrumental variable estimation (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Dickson,
2013; Harmon and Walker, 2000; Trostel et al., 2002).
1See, e.g., Bettinger et al. (2010) for Colombia.
2Other countries with similar vocational systems are Denmark and Germany (Hanushek et al., 2011).
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However, when dealing with the heterogeneity issue, the literature has not converged
to a standard method for integrating it into the analysis (Lemieux, 2008). Therefore, re-
searchers usually rely on different methods when accounting for heterogeneity in returns
to education: Sub-sample analysis (Harmon et al., 2003), non-parametric estimation
(Henderson et al., 2011), Bayesian hierarchical models (Koop and Tobias, 2004), and
quantile regression (Fasih et al., 2012; Martins and Pereira, 2004). The first three meth-
ods focus mainly on the existence and the nature of heterogeneity, which are not the focus
of this chapter. However, quantile regression (QR) is instead more appropriate to our
research question, because QR estimates the returns to education over the wage distribu-
tion, allowing for heterogeneity through quantile-specific intercepts and quantile-specific
slopes.
The use of QR in returns to education studies was hindered for many years because
the endogeneity problem in QR models could not be solved. However, recent studies by
Chernozhukov and Hansen (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2008, 2013) propose an instru-
mental variable quantile regression (IVQR) approach that deals with both heterogeneity
and endogeneity at the same time. Although the IVQR method has been applied in
many research fields in economics (Atella et al., 2008; Autor et al., 2012; Eren, 2009;
Lamarche, 2011; Maynard and Qiu, 2009; Wehby et al., 2009), it is relatively new to
the returns to education literature. Only two studies implement IVQR to propose alter-
native instruments for schooling (Arabsheibani and Staneva, 2012) and to examine the
inequality-reducing effect of education in China (Wang, 2013).
Exploiting a major education reform that took place in Switzerland in the 1970s, we
use IVQR to causally estimate the returns to education over the wage distribution, and
we compare the results with standard QR and ordinary least squares (OLS) to determine
whether taking endogeneity into account changes results and conclusions. In a second
step, we also distinguish between educational paths, to add a new comparison between
and within academic and vocational education. In this latter comparison we are especially
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interested in the presence of heterogeneity, and we therefore use only conventional QR
methods.3
The results provide evidence that there is no unique causal effect of schooling and
that for each individual the effect may deviate from those extensively documented by
ordinary least squares or two-stage least squares. In particular, while ordinary quantile
regression estimates increasing returns in the quantile index, once the endogeneity of
schooling is taken into account we instead observe higher returns at lower quantiles of
the wage distribution.
We also reveal significant heterogeneity within the academic and the vocational track,
and comparing these two paths shows that academic education does not always yield
higher returns. In the upper half of the wage distribution, individuals with an academic
background have higher returns than individuals with a vocational background. However,
at lower quantiles of the wage distribution, vocational education brings higher returns
than academic education, suggesting that answering the question of which type of edu-
cation has larger returns is not as easy as it might appear from descriptive statistics or
mean regression.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of
the theoretical background related to our research questions. Section 3.3 introduces the
data set and presents descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 shows the econometric models in
detail. Section 3.5 presents the results, and section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Theory and Empirical Background
In this section, we briefly present some theoretical background and empirical evidence
to derive our hypotheses and provide a structure for our empirical analysis. We follow
the theoretical model developed by Card (1999); its most interesting feature is that it
3Nevertheless, we also performed instrumental variable (quantile) regressions, which are presented in
appendix Table 3.7.6.
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considers both heterogeneity in the returns and endogeneity of education attainment in
the wage equation at the same time.
Following Card, we assume that individuals choose their level of education to maxi-
mize the following utility function defined over wage and years of education:
U(w, S) = ln(w)− f(S) = ln[g(S)]− f(S) (3.2.1)
where g(S) and f(S) are increasing convex functions that represent the benefits and costs
of schooling, respectively. The condition w = g(S) captures the observable relationship
of wage to schooling, i.e., the level of wages available at each level of education. The first
order condition for optimal education is:
g′(S)
g(S)
= f ′(S) (3.2.2)
In the optimum, the marginal rate of return to education equals the marginal cost. Indi-
vidual heterogeneity in the optimal education choice arises from two sources: differences
in the cost of education, represented by the variation in f(S), and differences in the
monetary benefit of education, represented by the variation in g′(S)/g(S).
To characterize the well-documented fact that (log)wage is a nearly linear function
of schooling that may vary across individuals,4 we impose the following functional form
to the heterogeneity components:
MBi =
g′(S)
g(S)
= bi − k1 · Si (3.2.3)
MCi = f
′(S) = ri + k2 · Si (3.2.4)
where bi and ri are random variables with some joint distribution across the population
4Card and Krueger (1992), Heckman and Polachek (1974), and Hungerford and Solon (1987) present
evidence suggesting that wages are nearly log-linear with respect to schooling. Furthermore, Park (1994)
finds log-linearity to be a good approximation of the wage-schooling relationship not only at the mean
but also for several quantiles of the wage distribution.
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i = 1, 2, .. and k1 and k2 are non-negative constants. To derive an equation for the natural
logarithm of wage, we need to integrate the expression for the marginal rate of return to
education with respect to Si:
ln(wi) = ai + bi · Si − 1
2
· k1 · S2i (3.2.5)
where ai is an individual-specific constant of integration.
Equation (3.2.5) is a general version of the functional form adopted in Mincer (1974).
However, the salient feature of Card’s model is that individual heterogeneity potentially
affects both the intercept of the wage equation (through ai) and the slope of the wage-
education relation (through bi).
This latter feature introduces three important issues into the empirical work. First,
we should expect different returns to education for individuals with different levels of abil-
ity. More specifically, given that individuals acquire education up to the point where the
marginal cost equals the marginal rate of return, and given that costs depend negatively
on ability, we should observe that returns to education decrease as ability increases. This
means that, while higher-ability individuals have on average higher wages, the slope of
their wage-education profile is flatter than that for lower-ability individuals. Second, we
cannot assess the true impact of education on wages without solving the bias introduced
by the endogeneity of schooling attainment, because otherwise cross-sectional estimates
are (marginally) upward biased by an omitted ability variable (Heckman et al., 2006).
Third, if we want to study how education affects different individuals, we need to account
simultaneously for heterogeneity and endogeneity.
To incorporate these features into our analysis, we use IVQR, which estimates the
causal effect of education on conditional quantiles of the wage distribution, allowing for
quantile-specific intercepts and quantile-specific slopes. Given that IVQR is a relatively
new method, the vast majority of the literature uses conventional QR to investigate
the heterogeneous effects of education on wage (Fasih et al., 2012; Harmon et al., 2003;
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Hartog et al., 2001; Martins and Pereira, 2004). From these studies we conclude that
returns to education vary substantially over the wage distribution. These studies also
suggest that returns to education increase in the quantiles of wage distribution. As we
can interpret the quantile index as a measure of ability (Arias et al., 2001; Mwabu and
Schultz, 1996), this finding contrasts with what we would theoretically expect. However,
the implicit assumption of exogenous schooling in conventional QR studies may explain
the discrepancy between theoretical expectation and empirical findings.
The few studies applying IVQR in the return-to-education context present mixed
results. Using spouse education as an instrument for education, Wang (2013) investi-
gates the evolution of the returns in China over time, to examine the inequality-reducing
effect of education. He estimates slightly decreasing returns to education over the wage
distribution, ranging from 5.1 percent at the lowest quartile to 3.1 percent at the highest
quartile. Proposing risky sexual behavior at an early age as a new instrument for school-
ing, Arabsheibani and Staneva (2012) apply IVQR to Russian data and find increasing
returns over the wage distribution. Specifically, they estimate a 5 percent return at the
lowest decile and a 15 percent return at the highest decile. However, when estimating the
causal return to education both approaches rely on a demand-side variation in schooling,
making defending the orthogonality between the instruments and the error term of the
wage equation very difficult. In our study, by contrast, we look into a supply shock as
source of exogenous variation in years of education, which is a much more reliable tool
to identify the causal effect of education on wages (Arcand et al., 2005).
Pushing the analysis of heterogeneous returns one step further, researchers and pol-
icymakers are often interested in the return to different educational types, such as aca-
demic and vocational education. While most studies on returns to education do not
consider the content of the variable years of education, policymakers—as well as students
and parents—may need more information than simply the average return to one year of
education. In this context, a typical question is whether vocational education yields a
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lower or higher labor market return than an academic education of the same number of
years. Furthermore, such type-specific return might well be different for individuals at
different points of the wage (ability) distribution.
So far, the few existing papers seem to suggest that academic degrees have generally
larger benefits than vocational degrees. Dearden et al. (2002) provide evidence on the
relative value of academic and vocational qualifications in the British labor market. Their
results appear to show that the wage premium associated with academic qualifications
is on average higher than that associated with vocational qualifications at the same
level. Similarly, Saniter (2012) examines the returns to education for different educational
groups in Germany. He comes to the conclusion that the return to education is 8.5 percent
for the entire sample, 2.3 percent for graduates from the basic school track (vocationally
oriented), and 11 percent for graduates from a higher school track (academically oriented).
Focusing on non-monetary benefits of educational tracks, Hanushek et al. (2011) conclude
that gains in youth employment from vocational education are offset by less adaptability
and consequent diminished employment later in life. Thus, over the life-cycle, academic
education seems to have larger non-monetary benefits than vocational education.
However, none of these studies analyze the return to one extra year of academic
education with the return to one extra year of vocational education to investigate whether
one type brings a return premium over the other type, nor do they explore the possibility
of heterogeneous effects between and within educational paths. This is probably the case
because many countries do not have an education system that allows acquiring all levels
of education, including tertiary degrees in either the academic or the vocational track.
However, Switzerland has both academic and vocational education at all levels, so with
our study we are able to add novel results to the discussion on academic versus vocational
track by revealing the heterogeneous effects of the two educational types.
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3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Before presenting the data and providing descriptive statistics, we briefly introduce the
current Swiss education system, which is needed to understand how we can address
the endogeneity and heterogeneity issues. The education system in Switzerland consists
of parallel paths divided into vocational and academic education. After nine years of
compulsory schooling, about two-thirds of a youth cohort choose to pursue vocational
education and training, mostly within what is called the “dual system” of apprenticeship
training. This kind of training generally comprises a curriculum-based on-the-job training
component and a theoretical component taught at specialized vocational schools. After
graduation, most of these apprentices work as skilled workers within their occupational
fields. Vocational graduates also have several options for continuing their education.
They may choose to go into higher vocational education and acquire a higher vocational
education degree or a university of applied sciences degree (Tuor and Backes-Gellner,
2010).
On the other hand, about one fifth of a youth cohort chooses to pursue an academic
track. They remain in the academic school system, attend academic secondary school
and obtain a “Matura,” a high school diploma that is a prerequisite for tertiary academic
education. Afterwards, they can acquire degrees at tertiary academic institutions such as
universities and federal institutes of technology and earn a bachelor’s degree, a master’s
degree, or a doctorate. Therefore, in the Swiss system we find students with, for example,
nine years of education in a vocational track along with students with nine years of pure
academic track. Switzerland thus has the best setting to answer the research questions
we raised in the previous section.
We base our analysis on data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS), produced
annually by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. The data are collected by telephone
interviews, and the sample is representative for the adult population permanently living
in Switzerland. The main purpose of the SLFS is to provide information on employ-
61
CHAPTER 3. RETURNS TO EDUCATION OVER THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION
ment patterns and on the structure of the labor force. Strict adherence to international
definitions makes Swiss data comparable with OECD, European, and U.S. data. The
SLFS was conducted for the first time in 1991 and is based on a sample of about 105,000
interviews. We select the period 2000-2009, and we pool these cross-sections to build our
sample.5 We take the 2000-2009 period because the SLFS renewed its questionnaire in
1999 and because since 2010 the SLFS has been issued quarterly.
To avoid special circumstances such as those that might arise from retirement, our
sample takes into account only males aged 18-60. We also restrict the sample to employed
individuals to avoid misspecification resulting from people being in school or not being
active in the labor force. Among the employed, to retain individuals with attachment to
the labor market, we focus on fully employed workers.6 The wage variable of the SLFS
comes from the Swiss Survey on Income and Living Conditions, a very precise data source
for income resulting from labor activity. We also exclude 0.5 percent of each tail end of
the wage distribution to attenuate the impact of outliers and remove implausible values.
Wages are expressed in Swiss Francs (CHF) throughout the entire chapter, inflated to
the year 2010.7
In the SLFS, for each individual, we can observe the entire educational path from
compulsory education to doctorate, and we dichotomize the educational paths into aca-
demic and vocational according to the official definition of the Swiss State Secretariat for
Education, Research and Innovation (appendix figure 3.7.1). After removing individuals
with missing values, we are left with 34,744 observations in the sample. Tables 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 provide descriptive statistics.8
From the descriptive analysis on the full sample (table 3.3.1), we observe that, over
the 2000-2009 period, the average worker earned an annual wage of CHF 81,868 and has
5The SLFS is a rotating panel. We keep one observation per individual to prevent problems of
nonrandom attrition and clustering.
6We use the official definition of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, which considers an individual as
fully employed if he or she has an employment of at least 90 percent.
7In 2010, 1 CHF = 1 USD. In Switzerland, inflation is very low and stable over time.
8See appendix Table 3.7.1 for the details on sample construction.
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Table 3.3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Annual wage 81,868 41,824 12,816 390,292
Age 40.23 10.09 18.00 60.00
Years of education 13.16 2.88 7.00 21.00
Years of vocational 2.82 2.34 0.00 9.00
Years of academic 1.80 3.56 0.00 12.50
Compulsory education 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Vocational education 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Academic education 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
N 34,744
Notes: Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
acquired 13.16 years of education. In line with the statistics at the national level, in
our sample 65 percent of the individuals followed a vocational path, whereas 23 percent
obtained an academic degree (Tuor and Backes-Gellner, 2010). The rest of the sample
(12 percent) has compulsory education as the highest educational level. Table 3.3.2
presents descriptive statistics over the wage distribution, which shows the well-known
positive relationship between education and wage. However, these figures do not take into
account unobserved heterogeneity; in particular, differences in ability are not factored in.
Therefore, descriptive results give no indication of the causal wage effects of different
types of education.
3.4 Methods
In this section, we first introduce the equations to be estimated. We use two different
models: one to analyze the return to education and one to compare the academic track
with the vocational track. Second, we briefly describe the estimation methods we apply,
i.e., OLS, QR, and instrumental variable estimations. Given that QR and IVQR are
not as common as OLS and two-stage least squares (TSLS), we give a brief overview of
these two methods following Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Chernozhukov and Hansen
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(2013). Third, we describe and discuss the instrumental variables we use for the causal
estimation of the returns to education.
3.4.1 The Wage Equations
To estimate the private monetary return to one additional year of education, we consider
the following Mincer-like equation:
ln(wi) = δ0 + βS · Si + δ1 · Agei + δ2 · Age2i + ϕt + ui (3.4.1)
In equation (3.4.1), wi is the annual wage of individual i, Si represents the years of
education, Agei is a proxy for labor market experience, ϕt is a set of time controls, and ui
is an error term. As is common in the literature, we exclude various determinants of wages
such as tenure and industry sector, because such variables are potentially endogenous
and determined by education itself (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In model (3.4.1), the
coefficient of interest is the one on the variable years of schooling βS, which we expect to
be positive and significant.
To compare the effect of one additional year of academic education to the effect of
one additional year of vocational education, we develop a model similar to that used by
Hartog et al. (2001) and Vandenbussche et al. (2006). Hartog et al. modify the classical
Mincer wage equation and include a spline in year of education for three categories of the
school system: primary, secondary, and tertiary education. With this specification, they
investigate the different effects of education on wages among different levels of education.
With a similar specification, Vandenbussche et al. study the effect of tertiary education on
the growth rate of countries. They separate the effect of tertiary education from primary
and secondary education to show that skilled labor has a higher growth-enhancing effect
for countries closer to the technological frontier. In our case, we decompose the education
variable as defined in model (3.4.1) into its three components: compulsory education (C),
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vocational education (V ), and academic education (A). Thus, we can rewrite equation
(3.4.1) as follows:
ln(wi) = δ0 + βC · Ci + βV · Vi + βA · Ai + δ1 · Agei + δ2 · Age2i + ϕt + ui (3.4.2)
In model (3.4.2), the parameters of interest are βV and βA. With this second specification,
we compare the return premium of one additional year of vocational education with the
premium of one additional year of academic education.9 While expecting both parameters
to be significant and positive is reasonable, building expectations about the comparison
between the two is not straightforward, for the following two reasons. First, previous
literature on the topic is scarce. Existing studies either compare higher tracks with lower
tracks (Saniter, 2012) or focus on non-monetary returns (Hanushek et al., 2011). Second,
the returns to the vocational and academic education may be heterogeneous over the wage
distribution, making predictions on the comparison between them difficult to formulate.
3.4.2 Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression
The vast majority of applied econometrics focuses on averages, and such focus partly re-
flects the difficulty of producing credible average causal effects. As long as the dependent
variable is binary, the mean describes the entire distribution. However, many variables
such as earnings have continuous distributions, which can change in response to treat-
ments in ways that averages do not fully reveal. QR provides a straightforward, powerful
tool for modeling distributional effects, even if the underlying mechanism is complex and
multidimensional (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
To allow for heterogeneous effects of education on wages, we consider the τ th condi-
9To test whether the two coefficients are different, we perform an F -test, whose null hypothesis is:
βˆV − βˆA = 0.
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tional quantile wage function hereafter (we drop the indexes for clarity):
Qln(w)[τ |X,S] = X ′α(τ) + β(τ)S (3.4.3)
where X denotes all explanatory variables other than education (1, Agei, Age
2
i , ϕt), α(τ)
is the return to X at the τ th quantile, β(τ) is the return to education at the τ th quantile,
and τ ∈ (0, 1) 7→ X ′α(τ) + β(τ)S is strictly increasing in τ . In equation (3.4.3) the
returns to education are a function of τ , allowing for heterogeneous effects of education
on wages.
Assuming the error term in the wage equation to be independent ofX and S, Koenker
and Bassett (1978) propose finding the best predictor of log-wage given X and S under
the asymmetric least absolute deviation loss. Doing so means estimating α(τ) and β(τ)
in equation (3.4.3) by solving the following minimization problem:
Qln(w)[τ |X,S] = arg min
α(τ),β(τ)
E[ρτ (ln(w)−X ′α(τ)− β(τ)S)] (3.4.4)
where ρτ (ui) is the“check function” defined as ρτ (ui) = [τ −1(ui ≤ 0)]ui. In practice, the
minimization problem is solved via linear programming and implemented in many statis-
tical packages. As previously discussed, assuming independence between the education
variable and the error term may be too stringent because of potential unobserved wage
determinants (i.e., ability). To account for potential dependence between S and u in a
distributional framework, we apply the IVQR method developed by Chernozhukov and
Hansen (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2006, 2008, 2013).
As in the case of TSLS, the identification of the IVQR approach relies on the existence
of a vector Z of instrumental variables that are statistically related to S but independent
of the error term u. Additionally, we have to assume that, given the information (X,S),
the distribution of the structural error does not vary across the endogenous state S (“rank
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similarity”).10 The structural error is responsible for heterogeneity of potential outcomes
among individuals with the same observed characteristics. This error term determines the
relative ranking of observationally equivalent individuals in the distribution of potential
outcomes conditional on the individual’s observed characteristics. Rank similarity differs
from exact rank invariance by allowing deviations in the individual rank away from some
common level. In such formulation, we assume that an individual selects an education
level without knowing the exact potential outcomes. Unfortunately, we cannot test rank
similarity, but this assumption is consistent with many empirical situations where the
exact latent outcomes are not known before a certain treatment (Heckman and Smith,
1997).
Chernozhukov and Hansen show that assuming rank similarity implies the following
moment condition:
P[ln(w) ≤ Qln(w)(τ |X,S)|X,Z] = τ (3.4.5)
and thus, in our case:
P[ln(w)−X ′α(τ)− β(τ)S ≤ 0|X,Z] = τ (3.4.6)
The moment condition given in (3.4.6) provides a statistical restriction for use in estimat-
ing the parameters α(τ) and β(τ). Pointing out that equation (3.4.6) is equivalent to the
statement that zero is the τ th quantile of the random variable ln(w)−Qln(w)(τ |X,S) condi-
tional on (X,Z), Chernozhukov and Hansen formulate the problem as finding [α(τ), β(τ)]
so that zero is the solution to the standard quantile regression of [ln(w)−X ′α(τ)−β(τ)S]
on (X,Z):
0 = arg min
f∈F
E[ρτ (ln(w)−X ′α(τ)− β(τ)S − f(X,Z))] (3.4.7)
where F is the class of measurable functions of (X,Z). In our empirical application, we
restrict F to the values of Zi, i.e., f(X,Z) = Z
′γˆ. To obtain an estimate for β(τ), we look
10u|X,Z ∼ U(0, 1), i.e., for each S and S′ given (X,S): US ∼ US′ .
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for a value βˆ that makes the estimated coefficient on the instrumental variable γˆ(β, τ)
in equation (3.4.7) as close to zero as possible using a series of conventional quantile
regression.
In practice, the IVQR estimator consists of a two-step procedure:11 For a given
value of βj(τ), we first run the ordinary QR of ln(w) − βj(τ)S on X and Z to obtain
the estimates [αˆ(βj(τ), τ), γˆ(βj(τ), τ)]. Second, we test γˆ(βj(τ), τ) = 0 and save the
corresponding F -statistic, Fj. We then repeat these two steps for all the values in a
pre-specified support for βj(τ) and the value that minimizes the F -statistic is the IVQR
estimator βˆ(τ)IV QR. Once we have βˆ(τ)IV QR, we retrieve the corresponding αˆ(τ).12
The IVQR approach allows for an interpretation of the βˆ(τ)IV QR as actual effects
on individuals having fixed their level of unobserved heterogeneity at a given quantile.
Therefore, the effect is not identified only for the set of individuals whose treatment
is altered by switching the instrument from 0 to 1, as in the case of the IV quantile
treatment estimator proposed by Abadie et al. (2002). Furthermore, the IVQR method
puts no restriction of the form of the endogenous variables and instruments (i.e., they
can be binary, discrete, or continuous).
3.4.3 Identification Strategy
Given the widely acknowledged endogeneity of educational attainment in the wage equa-
tion, finding valid instruments to control for this phenomenon is crucial. However, choos-
ing suitable instruments remains a topic of great debate in the literature on returns to
education (Arcand et al., 2005; Dickson, 2013; Heckman et al., 2006). In general, an ideal
instrument should be correlated with educational attainment but uncorrelated with the
unobserved determinants of the wage.
11For further details, see Brunello et al. (2013) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008).
12To obtain the point estimates and standard errors, we use both the Stata command ivqreg and the
Matlab function invqr, with almost no difference between the two approaches. The codes are publicly
available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.hansen/research/
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The literature on returns to education used several instruments for education: quar-
ter of birth (Angrist and Krueger, 1991), early smoking habits (Evans and Montgomery,
1994), presence or gender of siblings (Butcher and Case, 1994), college proximity (Card,
1994), parental education (Harmon and Walker, 2000), and spouse education (Trostel
et al., 2002). Over the past decade, the literature has been investigating educational
reforms as a source of exogenous variation in educational attainment.13 In particular,
changes in school-leaving age (Dickson, 2013; Harmon and Walker, 1999) and compulsory
education expansions (Brunello et al., 2009, 2013; Fang et al., 2012) have been attracting
research interest. Following this last strand of the literature, we exploit a major reform
in the Swiss educational system to build our instruments and estimate the true (causal)
effect of education on wages.
In Switzerland, the main responsibility for education and culture lies with the can-
tons, which loosely coordinate their work at the federal level. The 26 cantonal ministers
of education together form a political body named the Swiss Conference of Cantonal
Ministers of Education (EDK). The EDK is responsible for educational reforms, policies,
and coordination at the national level. In 1970, the EDK proposed an important educa-
tional reform, with the aim of standardizing certain aspects of the Swiss education from
compulsory school through high school. This reform became official on October 29, 1970.
Previously, cantons had different compulsory school duration (seven, eight, or nine years)
and different school year start (either spring or fall).
The reform set nine years of compulsory education for all cantons, and mandated
that the school-year start in the fall. Given that some cantons were already in line with
this reform, only about half had to change their education system. Moreover, cantons
did not introduce the reforms immediately after 1970. They had time to adapt their
education systems in the years following the agreement, with continuous feedback to the
EDK on the reform status. Thus, we are able to keep track of the introduction of the
13For a recent study on the impact of educational reforms on educational attainment, see Braga et al.
(2013).
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reform in each canton. Additionally, to double-check the cantonal reform status, we also
contacted each canton’s educational ministry. Appendix tables 3.7.2 and 3.7.3 give an
overview of the reforms for each canton, the dates of their introduction in the canton (or
not), and the ways in which the reforms modified (or not) the canton’s education system.
We use the compulsory education expansion as an instrument for years of education.
The empirical literature suggests that postponing the allocation of pupils to tracks yields
positive effects on average educational attainment, because students stay in school longer
and drop out less (Braga et al., 2013). Similar to Brunello et al. (2009, 2013); Fang et al.
(2012), we exploit the series of natural experiments created by the staggered implementa-
tion of Switzerland’s education reform as an instrument for estimating each individual’s
completed years of schooling. This approach obviates the problem of endogeneity due to
unobservable variables that are correlated with both education and wage. Compulsory
schooling instrument might not work properly for individuals at the top of the distribu-
tion, because such high wage (ability) workers may be willing to acquire more schooling
independent of the education expansion. The IVQR method does not allow to compute
a first stage, but we can study the reduced-form effect to find out in which parts of the
wage distribution we have identification from our instrument.
Given that the effective date of the shift in school-year start also constitutes a (small)
exogenous change in years of education, we can also use this change as a second in-
strument for years of education completed. Pischke (2007) uses a similar approach for
Germany, where a cohort experienced a shorter school year. In our case, however, the
reform pertained all school levels from compulsory to high school, expanding the pool of
“compliers.” Furthermore, the individuals affected by this second reform where different
from the ones affected by the compulsory schooling expansion (different cantons and/or
different year of introduction). Appendix tables 3.7.4 and 3.7.5 present TSLS and IVQR
estimates for models using only the second instrument and over-identified models using
both instruments.
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3.5 Results and Discussion
3.5.1 Causal Returns to Education over Wage Distribution
Table 3.5.1 shows the regression outputs for model (3.4.1), which focuses on the returns
to education. Mean regression (column 1, table 3.5.1) estimates a return to education
of 6.7 percent, which indicates that wages rise by almost seven percent on average with
each extra year of education. The effect is highly significant and not far from the few
previous studies on returns to education in Switzerland, which estimate returns of about
7-8 percent (Weber and Wolter, 1999).
When we allow for heterogeneous effects of education on wage, an interesting picture
emerges. QR estimates (columns 2-6, table 3.5.1) show that returns to education increase
over the quantiles of the wage distribution. The return to education is 3.9 percent at the
bottom decile, increasing to 6.9 percent at the median (τ = 0.5), and reaching 8.9 percent
at the top decile of the wage distribution. These results already underline that average
effects hide useful information about the rest of the distribution: Further emphasizing
the heterogeneous effects of education on wage, Figure 3.5.1 reports the quantile-specific
returns to education from τ = 0.1 to τ = 0.9. Again, we observe increasing returns over
the wage distribution. Our estimated return patterns over the wage distribution is very
similar to those found by the literature for other countries (Fasih et al., 2012; Harmon
et al., 2003; Hartog et al., 2001).
Until now, however, we did not consider the endogeneity of years of education in
our empirical analysis. Therefore, Table 3.5.2 presents TSLS estimates of model (3.4.1).
As an instrument for years of education we use the expansion in compulsory education
that took place in some cantons after 1970. The returns to education estimated by
TSLS are slightly higher than OLS estimates, with a point estimate (standard error) of
9.9 percent (0.019). This result is typical in the literature on returns to education and
is usually motivated by measurement error in the education variables (Card, 2001) and
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Table 3.5.1: Returns to Education, OLS and QR Estimates
Variables OLS 1st Decile 3rd Decile Median 7th Decile 9th Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of education 0.067** 0.039** 0.060** 0.069** 0.076** 0.089**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.053** 0.037** 0.042** 0.048** 0.054** 0.067**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age2/100 -0.051** -0.039** -0.042** -0.046** -0.051** -0.064**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 9.118** 9.474** 9.287** 9.163** 9.056** 8.801**
(0.029) (0.050) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.050)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
(Pseudo) R2 0.292 0.060 0.149 0.206 0.239 0.232
N 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
Figure 3.5.1: Returns to Education, Quantile Regression Estimates
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Table 3.5.2: Returns to Education, TSLS Estimates
Variables OLS Reduced Form First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of education 0.067** 0.099**
(0.001) (0.019)
Age 0.053** 0.065** 0.174** 0.048**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003)
Age2/100 -0.051** -0.066** -0.211** -0.046**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.004)
Constant 9.118** 9.748** 10.192** 8.725**
(0.029) (0.033) (0.228) (0.214)
IV–Education expansion 0.034** 0.346**
(0.007) (0.054)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
R2 0.292 0.095 0.018 0.249
N 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744
Test for excluded instruments
F -statistic 40.75**
Under-identification test
Kleibergen-Paap LM-statistic 39.90**
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. In columns (1), (2),
and (4) the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage, in column (3) the dependent
variable is years of education.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
local average treatment effects (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Imbens, 2010). The coefficient
on the instrumental variable in both the reduced form and first stage has the expected
sign and is highly significant. In the first stage model (column 3 of table 3.5.2), our
instrument has a positive and significant effect on years of education. This finding is in
line with the expectations discussed in section 3.4.3, and is consistent with studies that
use similar instruments (Braga et al., 2013; Brunello et al., 2009, 2013; Fang et al., 2012).
In our specific case, the reforms increased educational attainment by one third of a year
on average, whereas previous studies estimated an effect of about half a year. The test
for excluded instruments has an F -statistic of 40.75, which is well beyond the accepted
standard of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). We are therefore confident about the strength
of the instrumental variable. We also reject the null hypotheses of under-identification
for our instrument (Kleibergen-Paap statistic).
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Table 3.5.3 shows the IVQR estimates of model (3.4.1). With this regression analysis
we causally estimate the impact of education on wage at a given quantile of the wage
distribution. As in the standard QR analysis, IVQR results also show that the returns
to schooling are heterogeneous over the wage distribution. However, the shapes of the
estimated returns over the quantiles are very different: the causal effect of education is
larger in the lower parts of the wage distribution, and the the effect becomes small or
insignificant at the top.
Specifically, the return to education estimated by IVQR is 18.3 percent at the first
decile, decreasing to 9.6 percent at the median, and going down to an insignificant 1.6
percent at the last decile of the wage distribution. These results indicate that the largest
gains to additional years of education accrue to individuals at the low end of the wage
distribution. Figure 3.5.2 provides a graphical illustration of these results from τ = 0.1
to τ = 0.9, with a quantile interval of 0.05. As the reduced-form quantile IV approach
produces qualitatively similar point estimates and distributional patterns to the structural
IVQR approach, we are confident that our substantive results are not sensitive to the
estimation procedure (Autor et al., 2012) and we see how important it is to study the
quantiles and not only averages.
A look at the reduced-form effects might explain the drop in returns at the top
of the wage distribution. As Figure 3.5.2 indicates, for top earners we do not have a
reduced-form effect, making it impossible to compute the respective instrumental variable
estimate. Therefore, the drop in return in the top decile is due to a loss of identification
rather than a zero causal effect of one additional year of education. This finding is
consistent with our discussion of subsection 3.4.3, in which we argued that our instrument
would not work properly for individuals at the top of the distribution.
The IVQR estimates are also consistent with the theoretical expectations we for-
mulated previously. As the quantile index τ can be viewed as a measure of unobserved
individual ability, the IVQR results are in line with the argument that individuals ac-
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Table 3.5.3: Returns to Education, TSLS and IVQR Estimates
Variables TSLS 1st Decile 3rd Decile Median 7th Decile 9th Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of education 0.099** 0.183** 0.169** 0.096** 0.066** 0.016
(0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.044)
Age 0.048** 0.005 0.026** 0.046** 0.055** 0.100**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Age2/100 -0.046** 0.005 -0.022** -0.045** -0.052** -0.097**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Constant 8.725** 7.781** 8.048** 8.828** 9.178** 9.166**
(0.199) (0.076) (0.055) (0.042) (0.043) (0.476)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Reduced form effect 0.034** 0.063** 0.046** 0.037** 0.035** -0.001
(0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
N 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
quire education up to the point where the cost equals the rate of return and where costs
depend negatively on ability (Card, 1999). In this setting, we would expect the returns
to education to be decreasing in ability, with the lower-ability individuals having the
highest return to education—which is exactly the pattern estimated by IVQR. More-
over, interpreting the quantile index as an ability measure is also consistent with the
notion that individuals with higher ability are likely to generate higher wages regardless
of their educational level. Conversely, individuals with lower unobserved ability would
gain more from the training provided by formal education. Our estimates suggest that
higher-ability individuals indeed have higher wages, but the slope of their wage-education
profile is flatter than that for lower-ability individuals.
As robustness check, we also use a different instrument (shift in school-year start)
and a combination of two instruments (compulsory education expansion and shift in
school-year start), which does not largely affect the estimated returns to education (see
appendix tables 3.7.4 and 3.7.5). However, with multiple instruments we have a gain
in the precision of the education coefficient and we can test for over-identification. The
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Figure 3.5.2: Returns to Education, IVQR Estimates
p-value of the Hansen statistic is always not significant, indicating that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that all our model assumptions are fulfilled—including the validity of
the instruments. This constitutes an important validity check for our estimates, which
we pass at all instances.
3.5.2 Heterogeneous Returns Between and Within Types of Ed-
ucation
We now focus on the comparison between educational types. Table 3.5.4 gives an overview
of the OLS and QR estimates of model (3.4.2). Column 1 of Table 3.5.4 presents OLS
regressions, which estimate a return to vocational education of 6.8 percent and a return
to academic education of 7.1 percent. These coefficients gather the effect of an extra
year of vocational (academic) education on wage, filtering out the effect of compulsory
schooling. By performing an F -test, we reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients
(p = 0.00), i.e., at the mean, the effect of one additional year of academic education
on wage is larger than the effect on one additional year of vocational education. The
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question, however, is whether modeling on average loses some important features of this
comparison. Therefore, we bring the discussion into a distributional framework.
Columns 2-6 of Table 3.5.4 present the QR estimates for model (3.4.2) at various
quantiles of the wage distribution. The first result is that, as in Table 3.5.1, returns
to both vocational and academic education are increasing in the quantiles of the wage
distribution. However, the increasing pattern and the magnitude of the estimated effects
are significantly different. At the lower quantiles of the wage distribution, vocational
education has a statistically significant return premium in comparison to academic ed-
ucation. From the fourth decile on, the situation is reversed: Academic education has
higher returns for one additional year of schooling. Thus, in the upper part of the wage
distribution, academic education brings a significant premium compared to vocational
education.
In particular, at the bottom decile, the return to one extra year of vocational ed-
ucation is 5.0 percent, whereas the return to one additional year of academic education
is only 4.1 percent. We reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients at each level of
significance (p = 0.00). At the third decile the situation is different, with an estimated
return of about 6.4 percent for both academic and vocational tracks (p = 0.66). At the
median, the returns to vocational and academic educations are 6.9 percent and 7.3 per-
cent, respectively. Similarly to OLS, at the median we reject the null hypothesis of equal
coefficients, with a p-value of 0.00. At the top decile, academic education brings a return
of 9.6 percent, while vocational education has an estimated return of 8.3 percent. The
difference between the estimated coefficients is statistically significant (p = 0.00). Figure
3.5.3 provides graphical support complementing the Table 3.5.4 results that we just dis-
cussed, comparing OLS estimates with QR estimates across the entire wage distribution,
estimated for all quantiles from τ = 0.1 to τ = 0.9.
For a better understanding of the academic premium, we rewrite equation (3.4.2)
as a function of the difference between the two educational tracks, with vocational ed-
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Table 3.5.4: Returns to Vocational and Academic Education, OLS and QR
Variables OLS 1st Decile 3rd Decile Median 7th Decile 9th Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vocational education 0.068** 0.050** 0.064** 0.069** 0.075** 0.083**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Academic education 0.071** 0.041** 0.064** 0.073** 0.082** 0.096**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Compulsory education -0.032** -0.062** -0.038** -0.028** -0.018** -0.015*
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Age 0.045** 0.029** 0.035** 0.041** 0.046** 0.058**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age2/100 -0.043** -0.031** -0.035** -0.039** -0.043** -0.053**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 10.133** 10.474** 10.259** 10.145** 10.043** 9.921**
(0.045) (0.081) (0.042) (0.039) (0.046) (0.081)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
(Pseudo) R2 0.309 0.072 0.163 0.220 0.250 0.243
F -statistic βˆV = βˆA 11.71** 23.63** 0.190 22.94** 51.06** 62.09**
N 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of annual wage.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
Figure 3.5.3: Returns to Vocational and Academic Education, Quantile Regression Esti-
mates
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Figure 3.5.4: Academic Education Premium, Quantile Regression Estimates
ucation as the reference category. While doing so prevents us from seeing the pattern
of vocational and academic educations separately, the transformation allows estimating
confidence intervals for the academic premium in comparison to vocational. Figure 3.5.4
plots the academic premium over the wage distribution, along with its 95 percent confi-
dence intervals.
One potential explanation for these results is the skill formation of vocational and
academic education. While the vocational education system provides a set of skills that
are specific to the job that the apprentices are learning (Busemeyer and Trampusch,
2012), in academic education the exploitation of the acquired skills strongly depends on
whether or not the workers are using them in the labor market (Dearden et al., 2002). In
addition, vocational education is likely a better fit for students at the lower part of the
wage distribution, because those students learn contents that better match and comple-
ment their innate abilities (Rosenbaum and Rosenbaum, 2013). As a consequence of this
skill formation and sorting mechanism, at the lower quantiles of the wage distribution,
vocational education brings a return premium because individuals with an academic ed-
ucation in this part of the distribution have a relative disadvantage in the job they are
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performing. Conversely, at some point in the wage distribution (in our data τ = 0.4) aca-
demic education, as opposed to vocational education, starts generating a return premium
because workers have the capacity of fully exploiting their skills in the labor market.
Given that we are more interested in the presence of heterogeneity and because we
did not find appropriate instrumental variables for both academic and vocational educa-
tion, we do not claim that the estimated effects in the between-within path comparison
are causal. We nevertheless performed some simple two-stage quantile regressions fol-
lowing the approach of Chen and Portnoy (1996), based on early work by Powell (1983).
Regression outputs are depicted in appendix Table 3.7.6. We use a dummy that equals
one if the canton of residence has a university as an instrument for academic education,14
whereas for vocational education we exploit regional variation in preference for vocational
education compared to academic education.15 Although we do want to put too much em-
phasis on these estimations because the instruments we use are only arguably exogenous
and because the local average treatment effects are difficult to interpret, it is important
to notice that we find—again—lower returns to academic education at the bottom of the
wage distribution and a return premium for academic education in the upper part of the
wage distribution. Thus it appears that, for the comparison of academic and vocational
education, the qualitative results do not change systematically if we take endogeneity
into account.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter presents evidence of heterogeneous returns to education over the wage distri-
bution. We use instrumental variable quantile regression and data from the Swiss Labor
Force Survey to isolate the causal link between education and wages at different quantiles
of the conditional distribution of wages. Our results provide significant evidence that no
14Dee (2004) and Card (1993) use a similar approach.
15As in Rupietta and Backes-Gellner (2012).
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unique causal effect of schooling exists and that for individuals the effect may be above
or below the average returns extensively documented using OLS or TSLS, depending on
their position in the wage distribution and their unobservable wage determinants. As
standard economic theory suggests that workers are paid according to their productivity,
we can interpret the individual’s position in the wage distribution as a proxy for ability.
This assumption—a common one in the literature (Card, 2012)—provides our results
with additional implications.
In particular, while ordinary QR results indicate that returns to education are in-
creasing in the quantile index, once we take the endogeneity of schooling into account, we
instead observe higher returns at lower quantiles of the wage distribution. Interpreting
the quantile index as a measure of unobserved ability, our findings suggest that less able
individuals profit more form one additional year of education. While higher-ability indi-
viduals have on average higher wages, the slope of their wage-education profile is flatter
than that for lower-ability individuals. This finding indicates, as discussed by Ashenfelter
and Rouse (1998), that more able individuals acquire more schooling because they face
lower marginal costs, not because they receive higher marginal benefits.
From a methodological point of view, one noteworthy result of our analysis is that
a reduced-form quantile IV approach, akin to TSLS, produces qualitatively similar esti-
mates to the structural IVQR approach, which is based on stronger assumptions. The
comparability of these estimates indicates that our core results are not sensitive to the
estimation procedure.
We also investigate the potential heterogeneity in the returns within and between
different educational paths. Exploiting the uniqueness of the Swiss educational system,
we complement the existing literature by confirming that, at the mean, academic educa-
tion brings higher returns. However, if we examine the returns over the wage distribution,
we observe two relevant—and until now unknown—features of the returns to vocational
and academic education. First, we reveal significant heterogeneity within each educa-
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tional path, with both vocational and academic education presenting increasing returns
over the wage distribution. Second, a comparison between the two tracks shows that
academic education does not always yield higher returns. In the upper part of the wage
distribution, individuals with an academic background have higher returns than individ-
uals with a vocational background. However, at lower quantiles of the wage distribution,
vocational education brings higher returns than academic education. These results imply
that answering the question of whether academic education yields higher labor market
returns than vocational education is not as easy as it might have once appeared from
descriptive statistics or mean regression. Indeed, the answer depends on the individual’s
position in the conditional wage distribution.
Our work can be extended in a number of ways. First, analyzing the evolution
over time of the quantile returns to education, and what impact the returns have on
the structure of wages, would be valuable. According to our results, education should
have an inequality-reducing effect over time, because individuals with lower ability (i.e.,
those at the lower quantiles of the wage distribution) appear to profit more from formal
education. However, such inquiry is complicated by the likelihood that the endogeneity
and measurement error biases change over time.
Second, in line with several cross-country studies conducted for example by Martins
and Pereira (2004) and by Trostel et al. (2002), researchers and policymakers might use
an international comparison to study how the causal returns to education change with
different wage distributions and education systems. Third, researchers could explore the
potential non-linear relationship between education and wages by allowing the returns to
differ not only between educational paths but also across education levels, as, for example,
in Buchinsky (1994); Hartog et al. (2001).
A fourth, and compelling, extension to our work would be evaluating the impact
of changes in the distribution of education on quantiles of the unconditional (marginal)
distribution of wages. Doing so would help estimate the effect of one additional year of
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schooling on the entire wage distribution, not only at a given quantile. However, to shed
light on this topic, we would need an adaptation of the unconditional QR approach (Firpo
et al., 2009) to instrumental variables estimation—an adaptation not yet available, as we
discussed in the previous chapter.
This chapter shows that typical estimates of the mean return to education pro-
vide a relatively incomplete characterization of the impact of education on labor market
outcomes and thus constitute a weak guide for public policy. Similarly, distributional
analyses using ordinary QR also constitute an inappropriate tool for describing the true
impact of education on wages, because they do not control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Our results suggest that the true impact of education on the distribution of wages is
highly heterogeneous, and we empirically support the argument that formal education
partially compensates for differences in innate abilities and early life conditions.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 The Swiss Education System
Figure 3.7.1: The Swiss Education System (Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office)
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3.7.2 Analytic Sample
Table 3.7.1: Sample Construction
Initial sample (SLFS 2000–2009) 160,925
Males 74,871
Fully employed 47,347
Age between 18 and 60 44,670
Not in education or gap year 42,612
Wage not missing 35,095
99 percent of wage distribution 34,744
Analytic sample 34,744
Notes: Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations. Column 1 presents the
variables considered to create the sample, while column 2 shows the number of
observations left after each sample restriction.
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3.7.3 Summary of the Reform of 1970
Table 3.7.2: Compulsory Education Expansion
Canton Entry Age Reform Year Before After First Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Zu¨rich 6 Yes 1977 8 9 1971
Bern 6 No 9 9
Luzern 6 Yes 1985 8 9 1979
Uri 7 Yes 1977 7 9 1970
Schwyz 7 Yes 1992 7 9 1985
Obwalden 7 Yes 1992 7 9 1985
Nidwalden 6 Yes 1992 7 9 1986
Glarus 6 Yes 1983 8 9 1977
Zug 7 Yes 1990 8 9 1983
Fribourg 7 No 9 9
Solothurn 7 Yes 1970 8 9 1963
Basel-Stadt 6 No 9 9
Basel-Land 6 Yes 1980 8 9 1974
Schaffausen 6 Yes 1982 8 9 1976
Appenzell A. 6 Yes 1981 8 9 1975
Appenzell I. 6 Yes 1984 7 9 1978
St. Gallen 6 Yes 1983 8 9 1977
Graubu¨nden 7 No 9 9
Aargau 7 Yes 1982 8 9 1975
Thurgau 6 Yes 1980 8 9 1974
Ticino 6 No 9 9
Vaud 7 No 9 9
Valais 7 Yes 1987 8 9 1980
Neuchaˆtel 6 No 9 9
Gene`ve 6 No 9 9
Jura 6 No 9 9
Notes: Authors’ research and calculations. Column 1 shows the entry age in compulsory
schooling, column 2 indicates whether a canton had to reform its educational system,
and, if so, in which year (column 3). Columns 4 and 5 show the years of compulsory
schooling before and after the reform, and column 6 indicates the first cohort affected
by the education reform.
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Table 3.7.3: Changes in School-Year Start
Canton Entry Age Reform Year Before After First Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Zu¨rich 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Bern 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Luzern 6 No Fall Fall
Uri 7 No Fall Fall
Schwyz 7 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Obwalden 7 No Fall Fall
Nidwalden 6 No Fall Fall
Glarus 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Zug 7 Yes 1973 Spring Fall 1958
Fribourg 7 No Fall Fall
Solothurn 7 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1973
Basel-Stadt 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Basel-Land 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Schaffausen 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Appenzell A. 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Appenzell I. 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1976
St. Gallen 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1975
Graubu¨nden 7 No Fall Fall
Aargau 7 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Thurgau 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Ticino 6 No Fall Fall
Vaud 7 Yes 1973 Spring Fall 1957
Valais 7 No Fall Fall
Neuchaˆtel 6 Yes 1973 Spring Fall 1958
Gene`ve 6 No Fall Fall
Jura 6 Yes 1989 Spring Fall 1974
Notes: Authors’ research and calculations. Column 1 shows the entry age in compulsory
schooling, column 2 indicates whether a canton had to reform its educational system,
and, if so, in which year (column 3). Columns 4 and 5 show the season of school start
before and after the reform, and column 6 indicates the first cohort affected by the
education reform.
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3.7.4 Alternative Instrument and Over-identified Models
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3.7.5 Returns to Vocational and Academic Education Instru-
mented
Table 3.7.6: Returns to Vocational and Academic Education, TSLS and Two-
Stage QR
Variables TSLS 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vocational education 0.128** 0.139** 0.161** 0.127**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Academic education 0.130** 0.091** 0.138** 0.162**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016)
Compulsory education -0.032** -0.033** -0.027** -0.026**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Age 0.032** 0.021** 0.025** 0.043**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Age2/100 -0.028** -0.020** -0.022** -0.036**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Constant 10.051** 10.148** 10.026** 9.871**
(0.070) (0.061) (0.074) (0.093)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
IVACA–University canton X X X X
IVV ET –German canton X X X X
Test for excluded IVs
F -statistic 56.29**
Under-identification test
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 111.14**
(Pseudo) R2 0.163 0.060 0.072 0.087
F -statistic βˆV = βˆA 0.08 32.62** 5.48* 8.32**
N 34,744 34,744 34,744 34,744
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of annual wage.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
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Chapter 4
The Effects of Involuntary
Separations on Wage Trajectories
[ A version of this paper has been submitted to the German Economic Review ]
4.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, concerns about the plight of job loss have been a relevant issue for
both researchers and policymakers (Couch and Placzek, 2010; Hijzen et al., 2010; White,
2010). Previous studies analyzing involuntary separations have shown that this type
of job loss implies monetary costs in terms of immediate wage reductions (Curti, 1998;
Monks and Pizer, 1998) and non-monetary costs in terms of re-employment conditions
(Farber, 2010; Polsky, 1999). It remains unclear, however, whether these wage reductions
are long lasting.
To fill this gap, the purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effects of involuntary
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separations on wages in the long term. To do this, we first estimate the earnings losses
of those who find re-employment over several years after an involuntary job loss. Second,
we are not only interested in measuring earnings losses of those that are re-employed,
but we are also interested in the total foregone earnings or the total productivity loss of
those that experience unemployment spells. Therefore, in a second step we also include
unemployed workers with zero earnings in our analysis. To do so, we have to use a new
empirical approach: a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator similar to the one
applied to gravity models (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Including these “zeros” is
important for at least two reasons. First, by considering the zeros, we are no longer only
measuring firm-specific loss of human capital (Addison and Portugal, 1989; Carrington,
1993; Neal, 1995) but instead estimating the total foregone productivity caused by an
involuntary separation.1 The unanswered question here is whether these productivity
losses are also long-lasting or whether they affect only the year of separation. Second,
from the methodological side, it reduces the selection bias due to the exclusion of one
portion of the population, as underlined by von Wachter et al. (2008).
We further deepen our analysis and investigate the determinants of an involuntary
separation, asking whether quantity and type of education can act as a protection against
job loss. Previous literature (Kettunen, 1997; Mincer, 1991) suggests that unemployment
incidences are lower among highly educated workers. For example, Polsky (1999) shows
that having either a college degree or at least some college is negatively correlated with
job separation. In this chapter, we not only focus on educational level (i.e., years of
schooling) but we also distinguish the type of education that people received in those
years (i.e., academic or vocational).
Our data comes from the Swiss Labor Force Survey from 1996 to 2009, a rotating
panel representative of the adult population permanently living in Switzerland. The
Swiss Labor Force Survey is produced annually by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office,
1For example, if we did not include these zeros, we would analyze the wage losses of those workers
who directly find a job after separation, excluding all individuals experiencing an unemployment spell.
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and the main advantage of this data source is that we can fully observe the reason
of each job separation. Therefore, we can distinguish between workers who separated
involuntarily from those who separated voluntarily or left for other reasons (e.g., injury,
working conditions, or personal issues) and obtain valid estimates of the wage trajectories
following an individual before, during, and after an involuntary job loss. Furthermore,
we can compare the earnings patterns for different types of separation to test whether
the consequences of self-reported reasons for separation are in in line with our theoretical
expectations.
Our results show that the wage losses following an involuntary separation are sig-
nificant and long-lasting. Separated workers suffer from an immediate loss of about 10
percent, a loss remaining statistically significant at least for four years after separation at
about 11 percent. If we include individuals with zero earnings to get an estimate for total
productivity loss, we find losses of 40 percent in the year of separation and a long-term
loss of about 19 percent four years after separation. These larger estimated losses can be
seen as an indicator of the total productivity loss caused by an involuntary separation.
This is because they comprise of zero labor market productivity during unemployment
and the loss of firm-specific human capital that is reflected by the lower wages after
re-employment (Addison and Portugal, 1989).
Compared to other reasons for separation, the earnings loss pattern is unique for
involuntary separations, because no other type of separation implies such permanent
scarring. Regarding the role of education, we find that tertiary education—either aca-
demic or vocational—plays a major role in reducing the risk of job loss.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: section 4.2 gives an overview of the
theoretical framework and empirical literature related to our research questions; section
4.3 introduces the data set and gives some descriptive statistics; section 4.4 introduces
the equations to be estimated and shows the econometric approaches in detail; section
4.5 presents the results, and section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Theory and Empirical Background
Monks and Pizer (1998) present early evidence of involuntary separations. They use data
from the U.S. National Longitudinal Surveys to estimate the increase in the probability
of changing jobs from 1971 to 1990, and identify how much of this change was volun-
tary. Overall, they find a positive trend in the probability of job turnover of about 13
percent, which can be decomposed into an insignificant increase in the probability of quit-
ting voluntarily and a significant 6.8-percent increase in the probability of involuntary
separation.
Both confirming Monks and Pizer’s results and extending the literature, Polsky
(1999) examines the consequences of job loss between 1976-81 and 1986-91. In general,
he finds stability in the incidence of job separation but a statistically significant increase
in the incidence of involuntary job loss relative to quitting. Polsky also shows that the
consequences of involuntary separation worsened over time: The re-employment rate of
workers who experienced involuntary job loss dropped from 67 percent to 62 percent in 15
years. Moreover, among those who found new jobs, the odds of receiving a considerable
wage cut rose from 9 percent to 17 percent during the same period. When these earnings
losses start and whether they are long lasting remains uninvestigated.
The literature on earnings losses focuses primarily on displaced workers, who have
been involuntarily separated due to plant closings or mass lay-off.2 This focus on dis-
placements due to plant closures and mass layoffs is meant to avoid selection problems.
Displacements are considered exogenous and usually affect the entire workforce to the
same extent. However, the selection problem then remains at the firm level, because
establishments that have to close are likely to be in the low-performing tail of the distri-
bution of plants and most likely also workers (Hijzen et al., 2010). Therefore, we decide
to use individually reported reasons for separation.
2The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics definition of a displaced worker is [s]omeone at least 20 years
old, with at least three years of tenure on a job, who lost that job due to slack work, abolition of a
position or shift, or plant closing or relocation.
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Regarding the persistence of earnings losses after separation, Ruhm (1991) intro-
duces the concept of “long-lasting scars” following job displacements. Using household
data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics, he shows that four years
after displacement, displaced workers continue to earn 10-13 percent less than their non-
displaced counterparts. The methodological standard for the earnings losses literature is
Jacobson et al. (1993), who use administrative data3 combining workers’ earnings histo-
ries with information about their firms to estimate the magnitude and temporal pattern
of displaced workers’ earnings losses. They find that high-tenure workers separating from
distressed firms suffer an immediate loss of more than 40 percent and a long-term loss of
about 25 percent per year.
Couch and Placzek (2010) conduct a revisited analysis of displaced workers’ earnings
losses. They argue that past estimates and the size of those reductions vary strongly
with the type of data used and the business cycle conditions, demonstrating that under
ordinary economic conditions, earnings losses are smaller than the estimations of Jacobson
et al. White (2010) obtains similar results, finding the typical displaced worker realizing
total long-term losses of USD 34,065, equivalent to an 11-percent loss compared to the
earnings of similar non-displaced workers.
In contrast to the U.S. evidence, most European studies find displacement losses
rather small and not always long-lasting (Couch, 2001; Eliason and Storrie, 2006; Hi-
jzen et al., 2010). As European countries usually have stronger labor market regulations
in which wages are bargained between employers and unions for each industrial sector,
earnings losses studies for European workers generally find small but nevertheless sta-
tistically significant losses. Given these differences between regulated and non-regulated
labor markets, it is particularly interesting to study the effects in Switzerland. This is
because Swiss labor market regulations are more like in the U.S. than in many European
countries, but many other economic conditions are very close to the European model
(e.g., the educational system). This unique feature of Switzerland makes it interesting to
3Administrative records of the State of Pennsylvania, 1974–1986.
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study the determinants of involuntary separations, as we do in a second step during our
empirical analysis.
Previous literature explained the origin of earnings losses with human capital theory
(Fallick, 1996). According to human capital theory (Becker, 1962), wage losses occur
if separated workers have not only general human capital but also firm-specific human
capital. If an individual with a large portion of specific human capital loses his or her
job, the consequences of the separation will be more severe than for an individual who
has more general human capital. Because firm-specific skills do not increase the workers’
productivity outside a particular firm, workers with a large stock of firm-specific human
capital cannot transfer to a firm in which productivity—and thus wages—will be as high.
If we take this theoretical argument literally, we should always expect a loss associated
with a separation, independent of the type of separation. However, such is not always
the case, as many job changes—especially voluntary ones—may result in wage gains.
Somewhat different patterns can be expected when referring to Lazear’s skill-weights
approach (Lazear, 2009) to explain differences in earnings losses across different types
of separation. In Lazear’s model, all skills are general but firms use them in different
combinations with different weights attached to them. The advantage of his view of
human capital is that it provides a more differentiated explanation of wage changes
following a separation. According to Lazear’s model, the expected wage change is likely
to be negative whenever turnover is involuntary, because if workers choose not to move
they have difficulties in finding a firm with an adequate skill-weights profile. He argues
that the presence of these difficulties implies a negative wage change in terms of expected
wages (keeping market thickness constant).
Conversely, we should expect a positive wage change for voluntary leavers, because
the quitters would be those who find an outside offer from a firm with a better skill-
weights profile. We also investigate and discuss these issues by estimating wage changes
for different types of separation in section 4.5.
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4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We base the analysis on data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) between 1996
and 2009. The Swiss Federal Statistical Office produces the SLFS annually and it is
representative for the adult population permanently living in Switzerland. The main
purpose of the SLFS is to provide information on the structure of the labor force and
employment behavior patterns. Strict adherence to international definitions allows Swiss
data to be compared with OECD, European, and U.S. data. The SLFS is a rotating panel
based on a sample of some 105,000 interviews, in which four-fifths of the households from
the previous year’s survey are re-interviewed.
With this data set we are able to distinguish the involuntary separations from all
other types of separations, in addition to the classical demographic, educational, and
occupational characteristics. From a question asking the reason for the last job loss, we
can isolate those who separated involuntarily from those who separated for other reasons,
such as quit, retirement, injury, working conditions, limited contract, or personal issues.4
Thus, we are able to achieve valid estimates of the earnings pattern by observing a worker
before, during, and after an involuntary separation. Since one might be concerned that
asking people about the reasons for their separation might not reveal the true reasons
but rather socially desirable answers, we address the problem by analyzing earnings
losses for each other type of separation (e.g., quit) to see whether the respective results
are consistent with what one would expect if the answers were correct. For example,
we should observe that voluntary separations go together with wage gains and not wage
losses.
To avoid special circumstances, such as those that might arise from retirement, our
sample takes into account only individuals aged 18-65. We also restrict the sample to
individuals who are either employed or unemployed, so as to avoid misspecification due to
4The possible categories are involuntary separation, voluntary leave, limited contract, illness or ac-
cident, forced retirement, early retirement, retirement, working conditions, education, army duty, child
care, personal or family, desire for change, desire to stop working, and other.
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people who are in school, retired, or not active in the labor force. The earnings variables
come from the Swiss Survey on Income and Living Conditions, a very precise data source
for income resulting from labor activity. Thus, for those who are unemployed at the
time of the interview, we have zero earnings in the data. Among individuals who are
employed, we consider only those for whom the earnings information—net annual income
and hourly wage—is not missing.
After creating the panel and removing missing values, we are left with a sample of
67,590 observations. Table 4.3.1 provides descriptive statistics. Over the period 1996-
2009, the incidence of a job loss due to involuntary separation is 7.07 percent. Over the
same period, the average worker works 36 hours per week, earns 34.73 Swiss Francs5
(CHF) per hour, and has a net annual income of CHF 66,478. Almost 70 percent of the
sample has a full-time employment for the entire period of observation.
The average age in the sample is 42.2 years, and 55.6 percent of the individuals in
the sample are male. Regarding education, the average individual achieved 13.4 years of
schooling, divided among compulsory education (almost 10 percent), vocational education
(70 percent), and academic education (20 percent). In terms of educational degrees, 9
percent of the sample hold a primary education degree, whereas 58 percent achieved a
secondary level and 33 percent a tertiary level.
4.4 Methods
4.4.1 The Wage Equation
To quantify the earnings losses and their temporal pattern, we employ an approach similar
to Jacobson et al. (1993) by defining a worker’s earnings loss as the difference between
his or her observed and expected earnings had the events that led to the job loss not
5Wages are inflated to the year 2010. In 2010, 1 CHF = 1 USD. In Switzerland, inflation is very low
and stable over time.
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Table 4.3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Involuntary separation 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Annual income 66,478 39,326 0.00 571,654
Hourly wage 34.73 16.83 0.00 173.41
Weekly working hours 35.96 12.51 0.00 97.00
Male 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
Age 42.22 9.84 18.00 65.00
Full-time worker 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
Swiss 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.00
Tenure (in years) 9.86 8.88 0.00 48.41
Years of schooling 13.39 2.44 9.00 18.00
Primary education 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Secondary education 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Tertiary education 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Mandatory education 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Vocational education 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00
Academic education 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
N 67,590
Notes: Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
occurred. Letting yit denote the earnings
6 of worker i in period t and letting Si,s = 1 if
worker i experienced an involuntary separation at time s (and Si,s = 0 otherwise
7), the
definition of the loss is hereafter illustrated:
E(yit | Si,s = 1, Ii,s−v)− E(yit | Si,s = 0 ∀ s, Ii,s−v) (4.4.1)
where Ii,s−v is an information set at time (s − v) containing individual-specific earnings
determinants (either observable or unobservable), regardless of whether the individual
experienced an involuntary separation. We also assume v to be sufficiently large that the
events that led to separation have not yet begun.
The earnings at a given date are assumed to depend on the event of an involuntary
6We use the net annual income and the hourly wage as earning measures.
7“Otherwise” denotes individuals who did not experience an involuntary separation, but it does
not necessarily exclude the possibility that they separated for other reasons. We also performed our
investigation by comparing those who involuntarily separated with those who did not separate at all,
with results similar to those we present in section 4.5. We stay with our approach because it better
represents the typical working life of an employee.
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separation and on some controls for fixed- and time-varying characteristics. Thus we can
rewrite the earnings equation as follows:8
ln(yit) = αi + γt +X
′
itβ +
4∑
k=−4
δk · Skit + εit (4.4.2)
In equation (4.4.2), the individual fixed effect αi captures the impact of time-invariant
differences among individuals in observed and unobserved characteristics, and γt is a set
of dummy variables for each year in the sample that gauges the general time pattern
of earnings. The vector Xit consists of the observed, time-varying characteristics of the
individual. As most available variables—such as experience, tenure, or industry—might
be endogenous to the involuntary job loss and thus constitute a form of separation costs
themselves, we restrict our controls to age, age squared, and interactions among these
controls and gender.
The set of dummy variables Skit represents the event of involuntary separation and
δk measures the effect of such job loss in the years before, during, and after separation.
Specifically, Skit = 1 if worker i experienced an involuntary separation k years prior to (k
is then negative), during (k equals zero), or since (k is positive) year t; and Skit = 0 if
individual i experienced no involuntary job loss during period t. Therefore, decomposing
the sum
∑
δk · Skit yields a measure of the earnings loss during each year k.
4.4.2 Estimation Strategy
The first estimation strategy we use is the typical approach of the earning losses literature,
i.e. estimating equation (4.4.1) by fixed-effects methods (Couch, 2001; Jacobson et al.,
1993; Kletzer and Fairlie, 2003; Stevens, 1997; White, 2010; Zwick, 2012). OLS estimates
with no individual fixed effects are probably biased because of the endogeneity of different
types of job losses and because of the unobservable worker characteristics that may cause
8Consistent with the existing empirical literature, we assume the relation between our dependent
variable and the explanatory variables to be logarithmic.
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them. Researchers’ inability to distinguish between workers with high or low productivity,
leads to a sample of involuntary separations that might not properly represent the overall
working population. We use the panel structure of our data to mitigate this selection bias
by filtering out the time-constant heterogeneity at the individual level with the within
transformation.
Two general problems, still not properly covered in the existing literature, remain.
The first problem concerns the practice of interpreting the parameters of log-linear models
estimated by least squares as semi-elasticity. This practice can be misleading, especially
in the presence of heteroskedasticity and measurement error. With heteroskedastic errors,
the log-linear model does not consistently estimate the semi-elasticities.9 Because of this
issue, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that constant elasticity models should
preferably not be linearized but rather estimated by Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood
(PPML). Furthermore, due to Jensen’s inequality, in log-linear models we cannot predict
levels, because the expected value of the logarithm of a random variable is different from
the logarithm of its expected value.10
The second problem is related to the specification of the dependent variable, the
natural logarithm of earnings. If an individual is unemployed at the time of the interview,
his or her earnings resulting from labor market activity are zero. The logarithm of zero
is undefined, and we are left with an unbalanced panel. Including the zeros has at
least three advantages. First, it allows us to fully exploit the sample of individuals who
experienced an involuntary separation. Second, it mitigates the selection problem because
job separation affects the probability of working (von Wachter et al., 2008). Third, it
introduces a new measure of losses, because we otherwise exclude all spells with zero
earnings. If we include the zeros, we are not only measuring the earning loss after re-
employment due to a loss of specific human capital but rather the total loss resulting
from an involuntary separation. We call this new measure “productivity loss,” because it
9With heteroskedastic ε, E(ε|x) = f(x) and E(y|x) = exp(x′β)f(x). In this case, ∂E(y|x)/∂x 6= β.
10In case of concave functions such as ln(y), we have that E(ln y) ≤ ln E(y).
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reflects the value of the forgone productivity while the worker is not active in the labor
market. The unanswered question is whether the productivity loss is also long-lasting or
whether it affects only the year of separation.
To simultaneously overcome both these problems, we use the PPML estimator that
was introduced by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and further discussed in Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2011). The PPML estimator identifies the coefficients using the same
first-order conditions that are used by the maximum-likelihood estimator derived from
the Poisson distribution. However, the PPML estimator does not require the dependent
variable to be Poisson distributed (Gourieroux et al., 1984). Following Cameron and
Trivedi (2013), we can estimate the parameters of interest by solving the set of first-order
conditions hereafter:
n∑
i=1
[yi − exp(xiβ)] · xi = 0 (4.4.3)
The PPML approach can be seen as a nonlinear-least-square specification of an
equation with uniform weights given to observations. Without further information—or
assumptions—on the pattern of heteroskedasticity, giving the same weight to all obser-
vations is the more natural way of proceeding. In terms of estimated parameters, PPML
has two main differences with respect to OLS. First, as we already underlined, the co-
efficients of PPML do not suffer from bias that arises from estimating semi-elasticities
with a log-linear model. Second, PPML allows to make predictions on wage levels and
not only in terms of log-wages as in the case of OLS.
Another important feature of the PPML estimator is that it does not require the
dependent variable to be an integer, and it is also consistent with over-dispersion (Fally,
2015). Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) provide
additional evidence on the good performance of PPML by presenting a simulation study
using different heteroskedasticity patterns, and showing that the PPML estimator is the
least biased of various OLS functional forms, non-linear least squares, Tobit models,
gamma pseudo-maximum-likelihood methods, and in the presence of a large fraction of
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zeros in the dependent variable.
Furthermore, the PPML approach can be consistently adapted to panel data, with
the use of PPML with fixed effects (Fally, 2015; Wooldridge, 1999). This PPML panel
estimator is consistent to arbitrary patterns of serial correlation but requires the appro-
priate robust standard errors suggested by Wooldridge (1999) for valid inference. Con-
sidering all these advantages, we decided to use the PPML approach, which has never
been applied to research on separations and earning losses.
4.5 Empirical Findings
4.5.1 Effect of Involuntary Separation on Annual Income and
Hourly Wage
Table 4.5.1 provides regression outputs of the fixed-effects model.11 The first two columns
show the results with the natural logarithm of annual income as dependent variable for
the entire sample (column 1) and for full-time workers only (column 2). Usually, the
existing literature either makes no distinction between full-time and part-time or just
focuses on full-time workers. In this chapter, we distinguish full-time workers from the
entire sample to see whether those workers who go from a full-time job to another full-time
job are more, less, or equally damaged by an involuntary separation.
In terms of annual income (table 4.5.1, columns 1-2), the coefficients of the post-
separation variables are negative and significant at the 1 percent level, from the year of
involuntary job loss up to four years thereafter. Individuals who experience an involuntary
separation have—on average—an immediate loss in annual income of 10.4 percent and
a long-term loss of 11.4 percent three years after separation and 11.3 percent four years
after separation.12 In terms of Swiss Francs, the typical involuntarily separated worker
11Appendix Table 4.7.1 presents regression outputs using the PPML approach excluding zeros, with
results in line with the one depicted in Table 4.5.1.
12Note that the exact effect, calculated as exp(β)− 1, is slightly less. The exact immediate loss is 9.9
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Table 4.5.1: Earning Effects of Involuntary Separations, FE Estimation
Variables Annual income Annual income Hourly wage Hourly wage
Entire sample Full-time workers Entire sample Full-time workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 years before separation -0.011 -0.009 -0.019 -0.003
(0.028) (0.017) (0.024) (0.017)
2 years before separation -0.026 -0.028* -0.023 -0.017
(0.026) (0.013) (0.022) (0.015)
1 year before separation 0.052† -0.043** -0.035† -0.037*
(0.027) (0.015) (0.021) (0.016)
Year of separation -0.104** -0.093** -0.071** -0.091**
(0.032) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021)
1 year after separation -0.120** -0.106** -0.084** -0.103**
(0.033) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021)
2 years after separation -0.132** -0.104** -0.098** -0.106**
(0.034) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021)
3 years after separation -0.114** -0.085** -0.101** -0.098**
(0.036) (0.024) (0.029) (0.025)
4 years after separation -0.113** -0.099** -0.093** -0.106**
(0.039) (0.025) (0.030) (0.027)
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
R2 0.227 0.088 0.064 0.075
N 66,284 45,250 66,284 45,250
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses.
All models include a constant and interactions between gender and age. The dependent variable is expressed in
logarithm.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
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loses on average almost CHF 7,000 in the year of separation and slightly more than CHF
7,500 four years after separation, compared with their expected income had the separation
never happened. Altogether, the average post-separation loss within the first four years
amounts to CHF 38,760, which represents roughly 60% of a year’s wage (on average).
Given that the hourly wage is a more precise proxy of employees’ human capital use,
columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.5.1 present estimates with the natural logarithm of hourly
wage as the dependent variable. We do this additional analysis for two reasons: First, the
hourly wage takes into account the potential reduction in working hours in the new job;
and, second, the hourly wage filters out company bonuses and other potential biases not
related to productivity. The post-separation coefficients are all negative and significant
at the 1 percent level, with an immediate loss of 7.1 percent for the entire sample and 9.1
percent for full-time workers. At the same time, the loss four years after is 9.3 percent
for the entire sample and 10.6 percent for full-time workers. In terms of hourly wage,
workers going from a full-time employment to another full-time employment appear to
suffer from larger losses, especially in the long-term. However, in general we do not find
large differences between the entire sample and the sub-sample of workers going from a
full-time occupation to another full-time occupation after a job loss.
As commonly found in the earning losses literature, involuntarily separated workers
already experience a small earning loss one to two years before separation. According
to our estimates of Table 4.5.1, this loss is on the order of 3-4 percent, and it is usually
attributed to wage renegotiation aimed at avoiding separation or to negative time-varying
unobservables for those who lose their jobs later (Zwick, 2012). The pre-separation losses
are relatively small, and marginally but nevertheless significant.
These first estimates constitute an important result, because they give clear evidence
of the consequences of an involuntary separation, an event that jeopardizes an individual’s
earnings not only at the moment of separation but also in the long run. This supports
percent, and the exact long-term loss four years after separation is 10.7 percent.
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Table 4.5.2: Earning Effects of Involuntary Separations, PPML Estimation
Variables Annual income Annual income Hourly wage Hourly wage
Entire sample Full-time workers Entire sample Full-time workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 years before separation 0.004 0.004 -0.020 0.007
(0.026) (0.028) (0.039) (0.028)
2 years before separation -0.018 -0.023 -0.028 -0.005
(0.024) (0.026) (0.038) (0.028)
1 year before separation -0.069* -0.080** -0.076* -0.074*
(0.027) (0.030) (0.038) (0.031)
Year of separation -0.533** -0.557** -0.531** -0.560**
(0.039) (0.045) (0.049) (0.047)
1 year after separation -0.235** -0.255** -0.209** -0.247**
(0.034) (0.039) (0.045) (0.041)
2 years after separation -0.204** -0.222** -0.204** -0.223**
(0.034) (0.038) (0.045) (0.040)
3 years after separation -0.183** -0.196** -0.200** -0.202**
(0.039) (0.043) (0.048) (0.046)
4 years after separation -0.211** -0.231** -0.206** -0.227**
(0.045) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053)
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
(Pseudo) R2 0.220 0.211 0.082 0.092
N 67,590 45,839 67,590 45,839
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses.
All models include a constant and interactions between gender and age. The pseudo R2 is computed as the square of
the correlation between the dependent variable and its fitted values.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
the theoretical argument that involuntary separations involve a permanent loss of parts
of human capital. Looking at the time pattern of earning losses, we note that there
is no sign of recovery in the first four years after an involuntary separation. This is
somewhat different from what the literature usually finds (Couch and Placzek, 2010),
but we consider a time interval that might be too short to observe a wage recovery;13
studies with similar time intervals also estimate no post-separation recovery (Kletzer and
Fairlie, 2003; Ruhm, 1991).
Table 4.5.2 reports the results of our second econometric approach, the PPML. As we
13In the displacement literature, this time interval ranges between two years after separation (Couch
and Placzek, 2010) and twenty years after separation (von Wachter et al., 2008).
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discussed previously, the PPML allows us to analyze workers with zero earnings from labor
market activity, and thus estimate the total productivity loss caused by an involuntary
separation. As for Table 4.5.1, the first two columns of Table 4.5.2 present results with
the annual income as dependent variable (column 1 for the entire sample, column 2 for
full-time workers), whereas columns 3 and 4 present results with the hourly wage as
dependent variable (column 3 for the entire sample, column 4 for full-time workers).
A look at the set of dummies representing the post-separation productivity loss
reveals that the coefficients are all negative and significant at the one percent level. In
terms of annual income, involuntarily separated workers suffer from an immediate loss
of 41.3 percent in the year of separation and a long-term loss of 16.7 percent and 19.0
percent in the third and fourth year after separation, respectively.14 Estimated losses
for full-time workers are very close to those of the entire sample, ranging between 42.7
percent in the year of separation and 20.6 percent in the fourth year after. In terms
of hourly wage the estimated losses are also similar. We find an immediate loss of 41.2
percent (per hour) and a long-term loss of 18.6 percent (per hour) for the entire sample,
and an immediate loss of 42.9 percent (per hour) and a long-term loss of about 20 percent
(per hour) for full-time workers. Throughout Table 4.5.2 we also estimate a statistically-
significant pre-separation loss of about 6-7 percent, but the pre-separation loss is present
only one year before separation.
From a theoretical point of view, the results presented in Table 4.5.1 and Table 4.5.2
suggest that workers lose at least some parts of human capital when they are fired. Given
that the earning losses appear to be permanent, this also indicates that the human cap-
ital lost is not recovered in the years following an involuntary separation. This pattern
is consistent with both human capital theory and Lazear’s skill-weights approach. While
human capital theory predicts that the losses are due to a loss of firm-specific human
capital, the skill-weights approach predicts that displaced workers have difficulties to find
a new firm that matches their skill profile. The two theories differ in their predictions
14Computed as exp(β)− 1.
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when we distinguish between types of separation. Human capital theory, if taken liter-
ally, implies that any type of separation is associated with an earning loss. In contrast,
the skill-weights approach provides a more differentiated explanation of wage changes
following a separation by clearly distinguishing between voluntary mobility (quit) and
involuntary mobility (layoff). Lazear’s model predicts a negative wage change whenever
turnover is involuntary, because if workers choose not to move they have difficulties in
finding a firm with exactly the same skill-weights profile on the external labor market.
Conversely, the model predicts a positive wage change for voluntary leavers, because
such workers would be those who only go if they find an outside offer with a favorable
skill-weights profile. We investigate which mechanism is supported by the data in the
next subsection, by analyzing wage changes after several types of separation (other than
involuntary job loss).
4.5.2 Plausibility Checks
To find out whether involuntary job losses are the only type of separation that implies a
significant loss, and to check for the plausibility of our self-reported separation measure,
we implement the same econometric specifications to other reasons for separation. Doing
so constitutes an important falsification test for the reliability of our method of identifying
an involuntary separation, because we expect distinct differences in earning losses between
involuntary separations and other reasons. The rationale is that involuntary job losses
should be the only reason for a persistent earning loss because the other separation
motives do not imply a depreciation of human capital, as suggested by Lazear (2009). To
verify this hypothesis, we consider three additional motivations: separation due to (bad)
working conditions, separation due to personal or family reasons, and voluntary leave.
Table 4.5.3 and Table 4.5.4 present regression results of equation (4.4.1) divided by
reason for separation, estimated by fixed effects and fixed-effects PPML, respectively.
For the ease of comparison, we report regression outputs for involuntary separations in
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Table 4.5.3: Wage Effects for Different Types of Job Loss, FE Estimation
Variables Hourly wage Hourly wage Hourly wage Hourly wage
Involuntary Working Personal or Voluntary
separation conditions family reasons separation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 years before separation -0.019 -0.019 -0.012 0.007
(0.024) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018)
2 years before separation -0.023 -0.019 -0.020 -0.016
(0.022) (0.017) (0.023) (0.019)
1 year before separation -0.035† -0.039* -0.014 0.005
(0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
Year of separation -0.071** -0.013 -0.039† 0.038*
(0.024) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020)
1 year after separation -0.084** -0.005 -0.020 0.051*
(0.026) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020)
2 years after separation -0.098** -0.005 -0.009 0.058**
(0.026) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021)
3 years after separation -0.101** -0.003 -0.042 0.066**
(0.029) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022)
4 years after separation -0.093** -0.001 -0.015 0.052*
(0.030) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024)
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
R2 0.064 0.062 0.061 0.062
N 66,284 66,284 66,284 66,284
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level
are in parentheses. All models include a constant and interactions between gender and age. The
dependent variable is expressed in logarithm.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
each first column of both tables and we present results only for hourly wage losses.15 The
first important result throughout tables 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 is that no separation reason other
than involuntary job loss implies a permanent wage loss (using hourly wage or annual
income as dependent variable does not change the estimated effects significantly). The
estimated effects are also qualitatively the same either using fixed-effects estimation or
fixed-effects PPML.
In detail, we find that separation due to (bad) working conditions implies hardly
any significant loss either before or after the separation happened. The only significant
15Appendix tables 4.7.2 and 4.7.3 present regression outputs for annual income losses, but the results
are qualitatively similar to those of tables 4.5.3 and 4.5.4.
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Table 4.5.4: Wage Effects for Different Types of Job Loss, PPML Estimation
Variables Hourly wage Hourly wage Hourly wage Hourly wage
Involuntary Working Personal or Voluntary
separation conditions family reasons separation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 years before separation -0.020 0.009 -0.000 0.012
(0.039) (0.026) (0.026) (0.020)
2 years before separation -0.028 -0.008 -0.006 -0.025
(0.038) (0.023) (0.029) (0.020)
1 year before separation -0.076* -0.038 -0.019 -0.006
(0.038) (0.024) (0.028) (0.019)
Year of separation -0.531** -0.042 -0.137** 0.016
(0.049) (0.026) (0.029) (0.021)
1 year after separation -0.209** 0.007 -0.027 0.043*
(0.045) (0.026) (0.030) (0.022)
2 years after separation -0.204** -0.005 0.002 0.046*
(0.045) (0.027) (0.031) (0.023)
3 years after separation -0.200** -0.006 -0.035 0.058*
(0.048) (0.028) (0.033) (0.025)
4 years after separation -0.206** -0.003 -0.007 0.033
(0.053) (0.032) (0.036) (0.028)
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
(Pseudo) R2 0.082 0.066 0.067 0.067
N 67,590 67,590 67,590 67,590
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are
in parentheses. All models include a constant and interactions between gender and age. The pseudo
R2 is computed as the square of the correlation between the dependent variable and its fitted values.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
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loss is one year before separation, a loss with a magnitude of less than 4 percent (table
4.5.3, column 2). Workers separated because of family or personal reasons experience a
loss only in the year of separation. Their loss is rather small, ranging between 4 percent
using fixed-effect estimation and about 13 percent using PPML. In terms of significance,
in the fixed-effect model the loss is marginally significant, whereas in the PPML model
the loss is significant at the 1 percent level.
The last type of separation we consider is voluntary separation or quits (column
4 of tables 4.5.3 and 4.5.4). For workers who voluntarily quit their jobs we observe
a statistically significant increase in wage in the years following the separation. This
post-separation increase is permanent and ranging between 3 to 6 percent depending on
the estimation method applied. This is as expected by Lazear’s skill-weights approach.
According to Lazear, while the expected wage loss is necessarily positive if turnover is
involuntary, we should expect a wage gain for voluntary leavers, because the quitters
would be those who find an outside offer from a firm with a better skill-weight profile.
Therefore, we conclude that our way of identifying the type of separation produces valid
results.
4.5.3 The Determinants of Involuntary Separations
In the presence of such relevant losses following an involuntary separation, one corollary
question arises: What determines an involuntary separation? Specifically, we want to
investigate whether education level and education type are associated with a lower prob-
ability of involuntary separation. On the relation between education and involuntary
separation, it has been previously shown that education has monetary returns such as re-
duced unemployment risk (Mincer, 1991), shorter unemployment spells (Kettunen, 1997),
and smaller earning losses following a displacement (Eliason and Storrie, 2006; White,
2010). More generally, Farber (2010) finds that while the job loss rate of more educated
workers increased during the period 1984–2002, less educated ones continue to have the
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highest rates of job loss overall. We complement these results by analyzing whether this
is also valid for involuntary separations and whether the relation holds for all educational
types.
To fill this gap we estimate a Probit model16 in which the dependent variable equals
one if an individual suffered from involuntary separation during the period 1996–2009
and zero otherwise.17 According to the official definitions of the Swiss State Secretariat
for Education and Research, we code education in three ways according to the highest
degree obtained: years of schooling, education level (primary, secondary, and tertiary),
and type of education18 (mandatory, vocational, and academic). Beyond the educational
variables, we include demographic characteristics, region fixed effects, time fixed effects,
and industry fixed effects according to the General Classification of Economic Activities
(NOGA).
Table 4.5.5 presents the results. Focusing on the explanatory variables related to
education, we estimate an average marginal effect of –0.4 percentage points for a one-unit
increase in years of schooling (column 1). In terms of predicted probabilities, the overall
likelihood of experiencing an involuntary separation is 7.07 percent (either estimated
with the Probit model or just by looking at descriptive statistics). An individual with 9
years of schooling (compulsory education) has a predicted probability of experiencing an
involuntary job loss of 11.0 percent, which is significantly higher than the sample average.
An individual with 13 years of schooling (high school degree or vocational maturity)
has a 6.2-percent predicted probability of being dismissed, which is below the sample
average and almost half the probability of those holding a compulsory education as their
highest degree. For individuals who completed a university degree or a higher vocational
degree (18 years of education and training), the predicted probability of experiencing an
16Appendix Table 4.7.4 presents regression outputs for linear probability models, with almost no
difference from the Probit results.
17Here we do not claim the estimated effects to be causal, because we suspect the education variables
to be endogenous in the job loss equation. We mitigate this problem by including many control variables.
18Due to data limitations, we have to ignore individuals with mixed educational paths, i.e., individuals
with both academic and vocational degrees. According to Tuor and Backes-Gellner (2010), the proportion
of individuals with a mixed path in Switzerland are roughly 10 percent of the working population.
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Table 4.5.5: Determinants of Involuntary Separation, Probit Models
Variables Involuntary separation Involuntary separation Involuntary separation
dY/dX dY/dX dY/dX
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age squared/100 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure (in years) -0.018** -0.018** -0.018**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure squared/100 0.036** 0.036** 0.036**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Swiss -0.021** -0.021** -0.024**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.007 0.005 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Years of schooling -0.004**
(0.001)
Level of education
Secondary education -0.008
(0.007)
Tertiary education -0.025**
(0.008)
Type of education
Vocational education -0.006
(0.008)
Academic education -0.026**
(0.009)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES
Region fixed effects YES YES YES
(Pseudo) R2 0.170 0.170 0.169
N 67,590 67,590 67,590
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses.
All models include a constant. The pseudo R2 is computed as the square of the correlation between the dependent
variable and its fitted values.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
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involuntary job loss is only 5.9 percent. Thus, the more years of education, the better a
worker is protected against involuntary job losses.
We obtain similar results and predicted probabilities in column 2, where we split
education into primary (base category), secondary, and tertiary levels. According to our
estimates, having a tertiary degree—either vocational or academic—is the best protection
against involuntary job loss, reducing the overall probability of separation by one third.
Column 3 focuses on the type of education, divided into mandatory (base category),
vocational, and academic. Both vocational and academic tracks are negatively correlated
with the probability of an involuntary separation, but only the coefficient on academic
education is highly significant. Compared to those holding a mandatory education, having
an academic degree has a negative 2.6-percentage-point effect on the job loss probability.
Compared to workers with a vocational degree, workers having an academic degree are
less likely to experience an involuntary separation by 2 percentage points. In terms of
predicted probabilities, having mandatory education as highest level is associated with a
job loss probability of 10.2 percent, while having a vocational or academic degree reduces
the job loss probability down to 6.9 percent and 6.1 percent, respectively.
4.6 Conclusions
Using Swiss Labor Force Survey data from 1996 to 2009, we estimate the earning losses
of workers experiencing an involuntary job loss. We follow two empirical approaches: the
ordinary fixed-effect method and the fixed-effects PPML approach, a method new in the
literature of job losses that allows considering the full set of involuntary separations, even
those workers with zero earnings because of unemployment. Using the first approach, we
estimate an immediate loss of about 10 percent, a loss remaining statistically significant
four years after separation at about 11 percent. Using the second method, we estimate
a loss of 40 percent in the year of separation and a long-term loss of about 20 percent
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four years after separation. This second estimates are larger, because we are including
individuals with zero earnings from labor market activity, thus taking into consideration
that their labor productivity is fully lost during that time. We term this second loss “total
productivity loss,” because it captures the total losses that occur after an involuntary
separation and that represent the productivity that is foregone due to the job loss and
loss of firm-specific productivity.
We also find that while involuntary separations cause permanent scars, the other
types of separation—as expected—cause either light blemishes or even wage gains, as in
the case of voluntary leave. These results compelled us to study whether education level
or type is related with a lower probability of involuntary separation. We complement the
existing literature and find that tertiary education—either academic or vocational—plays
a major role in reducing the risk of job loss.
We are the first study to use fixed-effects PPML to estimate the earning losses after
a job separation, and we contribute to the methodological literature by adding a new
approach to analyze separation-related losses. The fixed-effects PPML has at least three
advantages: First of all, using the PPML approach we can identify the total productivity
loss following an involuntary separation, and not only the post-separation earning loss
of workers after they found a new job (we also account for the time to find a new job
and the earnings that are forgone during that period). Second, it is more appropriate
when the relationship between the dependent variable and the covariates is logarithmic
and it performs very well when the dependent variable is non-negative. Third, it allows
including individuals that have zero earnings from labor market activity with relatively
soft assumptions and without manipulating the dependent variable.
Our study could be extended in a number of ways. For example, the event of an
involuntary job loss might not be completely (conditionally) exogenous, which could bias
our estimated effects. We are especially worried about time-varying unobservable char-
acteristics that affect a worker’s performance and thus impact the likelihood of getting
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dismissed. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find appropriate exclusion restrictions in the
job loss literature, and unless relying on strong assumptions and use the matrix of (inter-
nal) instruments suggested by Hausman and Taylor (1981), we cannot use instrumental
variable approaches to estimate causal effects. Using matching estimators is also not
very helpful in our case, because we would match individuals according to observable
characteristics, while our true interest would lie in individuals’ unobserved traits—or at
least valid proxies for such traits. We thus prefer to mitigate the potential endogeneity by
filtering out the time-invariant heterogeneity among individuals and assuming the impact
of bad time-varying unobservables to be ignorable.
To conclude, in this chapter we were interested in the window of risks and/or op-
portunities that individuals face after an involuntary separation. Our estimates suggest
that the a window of opportunity does indeed open following a job separation, because
most of the sample finds a job after a separation. However, those who manage to climb
through will forsake their original earning projections for at least the following four years.
This result highlights the importance of reducing the likelihood of an involuntary job loss
before it happens, given the near impossibility of avoiding persistent losses once the sepa-
ration occurs. A better academic as well as a better vocational education help to prevent
such involuntary job losses, as demonstrated by the findings here and elsewhere.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 PPML without Zeros
Table 4.7.1: Earning Effects of Involuntary Separations, PPML without Zeros
Variables Annual income Annual income Hourly wage Hourly wage
Entire sample Full-time workers Entire sample Full-time workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 years before separation 0.064 0.004 -0.017 0.007
(0.018) (0.016) (0.034) (0.017)
2 years before separation -0.017 -0.026* -0.024 -0.012
(0.016) (0.013) (0.033) (0.016)
1 year before separation -0.033† -0.035* -0.037 -0.029†
(0.018) (0.015) (0.032) (0.017)
Year of separation -0.091** -0.080** -0.069* -0.078**
(0.021) (0.018) (0.034) (0.023)
1 year after separation -0.104** -0.087** -0.073* -0.079**
(0.022) (0.019) (0.035) (0.023)
2 years after separation -0.110** -0.100** -0.102** -0.100**
(0.022) (0.020) (0.035) (0.024)
3 years after separation -0.085** -0.079** -0.095* -0.085**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.037) (0.028)
4 years after separation -0.101** -0.104** -0.092* -0.097**
(0.027) (0.025) (0.041) (0.032)
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
(Pseudo) R2 0.210 0.198 0.059 0.079
N 66,255 44,884 66,255 44,884
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses.
All models include a constant and interactions between gender and age. The pseudo R2 is computed as the square of
the correlation between the dependent variable and its fitted values.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
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4.7.2 Additional Robustness Checks
Table 4.7.2: Income Effects for Different Types of Job Loss, FE Estimation
Variables Annual Income Annual Income Annual Income Annual Income
Involuntary Working Personal or Voluntary
separation conditions family reasons separation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 years before separation -0.011 0.000 -0.026 0.033
(0.028) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022)
2 years before separation -0.027 -0.007 -0.056* 0.005
(0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025)
1 year before separation -0.052† -0.046† -0.054* 0.020
(0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026)
Year of separation -0.104** -0.009 -0.058* 0.098**
(0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
1 year after separation -0.120** -0.002 -0.050† 0.108**
(0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
2 years after separation -0.132** 0.006 -0.019 0.114**
(0.034) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
3 years after separation -0.114** 0.004 -0.040 0.120**
(0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
4 years after separation -0.113** 0.003 -0.036 0.117**
(0.039) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
R2 0.227 0.227 0.228 0.228
N 66,284 66,284 66,284 66,284
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in
parentheses. All models include a constant and interactions between gender and age. The dependent variable is
expressed in logarithm.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.7.3: Income Effects for Different Types of Job Loss, PPML Estimation
Variables Annual Income Annual Income Annual Income Annual Income
Involuntary Working Personal or Voluntary
separation conditions family reasons separation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3 years before separation 0.004 -0.007 -0.008 0.019
(0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.019)
2 years before separation -0.018 -0.010 -0.033 -0.024
(0.024) (0.021) (0.029) (0.020)
1 year before separation -0.069* -0.053* -0.045† -0.004
(0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021)
Year of separation -0.533** -0.058* -0.147** 0.029
(0.039) (0.023) (0.029) (0.021)
1 year after separation -0.235** -0.015 -0.060* 0.050*
(0.034) (0.024) (0.029) (0.021)
2 years after separation -0.204** -0.025 -0.012 0.055*
(0.034) (0.025) (0.031) (0.023)
3 years after separation -0.183** -0.025 -0.029 0.064**
(0.039) (0.026) (0.032) (0.024)
4 years after separation -0.211** -0.021 -0.024 0.055*
(0.045) (0.031) (0.033) (0.027)
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES
(Pseudo) R2 0.220 0.209 0.201 0.210
N 67,590 67,590 67,590 67,590
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in
parentheses. All models include a constant and interactions between gender and age. The pseudo R2 is computed
as the square of the correlation between the dependent variable and its fitted values.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
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4.7.3 Linear Probability Models
Table 4.7.4: Determinants of Involuntary Separation, LPM
Variables Involuntary separation Involuntary separation Involuntary separation
Dummy=1 if Yes Dummy=1 if Yes Dummy=1 if Yes
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.006** 0.006** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age squared/100 -0.004† -0.004† -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure (in years) -0.018** -0.018** -0.018**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure squared/100 0.039** 0.039** 0.039**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Swiss -0.023** -0.023** -0.026**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Male 0.010* 0.008† 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Years of schooling -0.005**
(0.001)
Level of education
Secondary education -0.008
(0.009)
Tertiary education -0.026**
(0.010)
Type of education
Vocational education -0.005
(0.010)
Academic education -0.025*
(0.011)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES
Region fixed effects YES YES YES
R2 0.082 0.081 0.081
N 67,590 67,590 67,590
Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses.
All models include a constant.
Swiss Labor Force Survey, Authors’ calculations.
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Final Remarks
A well-educated population is essential for both economic and social development. It is
mainly for this reason that societies have a real interest in ensuring that children and
adults have access to a wide range of educational opportunities. Although researchers and
policymakers indeed acknowledge the central role of education in everyone’s life, there is
ambiguity about causal relationships and heterogeneous effects.
The aim of this dissertation was providing a detailed analysis of the heterogeneous
effects of investments in education and educational practices at different stages of an
individual’s life. The idea is that averages alone provide an incomplete picture about who
gains more from a given educational practice or investment in education. The first study
exploits experimental data to investigate the distributional effects of smaller classes and
classes with a teacher’s aide. The results reveal at least two novel contributions. First,
we showed that mid-achieving pupils are the ones that benefit the most form a small-
class learning environment. In contrast, neither low achievers nor top achievers appear
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to fully reap the gains of being in a small class. These findings are both encouraging
and worrisome at the same time. On the one hand, creating smaller classes is an efficient
strategy to increase mean achievement, because such strategy reaches—above all—the
average student. On the other hand, however, creating smaller classes does not necessarily
help close the achievement gap between low achievers and high achievers.
Second, we showed that attending regular classes with a teacher’s aide is beneficial
for low-achieving pupils. While having an additional instructor makes no difference for
most of the children, the additional support has a positive and significant effect on the
bottom quintile of the achievement distribution. Interestingly, such effect is even stronger
for boys and pupils coming from a disadvantaged background (i.e., black children or free-
lunch eligible children). These findings on teacher’s aide are encouraging, especially in
terms of reducing inequality. While the net effect of smaller classes on the achievement
gap is not clear, I show that adding a teacher’s aide would be an effective policy for
attenuating the achievement gap, particularly for classes with large shares of black or
low-income students.
The second study in this dissertation examined the casual impact of education over
the distribution of wages. By taking into account both the endogeneity of educational
attainment and the heterogeneity of schooling effects, we contribute to the literature in
at least three ways. First, we provide evidence that no unique causal impact of schooling
exists and that for each individual the effect is usually above or below the estimates
extensively documented by the empirical literature so far. Second, the results show that
the highest returns to education occur at the lower part of the wage distribution, which
means that the slope of the education-wage relationship is steeper for workers with lower
wages. If we assume that the distribution of wages reflects the distribution of abilities in
the workforce, which is a standard assumption in labor economics, the findings suggest
that less able individuals profit more form one additional year of education. In other
words, although higher-ability individuals earn on average higher wages, the slope of
124
CHAPTER 5. FINAL REMARKS
their wage-education profile is flatter than that for lower-ability individuals.
Third, we provide a correlational analysis of returns between and within the academic
and the vocational track. While most of the empirical literature supports the idea that
academic education yields the highest returns, we demonstrate that this fact does not
hold over the entire distribution of wages. Above the median wage, individuals with an
academic background have higher returns than individuals with a vocational background.
However, at lower parts of the wage distribution, vocational education brings higher
returns than academic education. These results imply that answering the question of
which type of education has higher labor market returns is not as easy as it might have
once appeared from descriptive statistics or mean regression.
The third study of this dissertation examined the earnings penalties faced by work-
ers when they experience an involuntary job loss. The first relevant contribution of this
chapter consists of the finding that the wage losses following an involuntary separation
are significant and long-lasting. Separated workers suffer from an immediate wage loss
of about ten percent, which remains significant at least up to four years after separa-
tion. Moreover, if we include individuals with zero earnings in the analysis, both the
immediate and the long-run loss almost double. The second main contribution is the
analysis of different reasons for job separation, and finding that only involuntary separa-
tions cause permanent scars. All other types of separation imply either light blemishes
or wage gains, as in the case of voluntary leave. This result highlights the importance
of reducing the risk of experiencing an involuntary separation, given the near impossibil-
ity of avoiding persistent losses once the separation occurs. According to our estimates,
acquiring more years of education as well as pursuing a tertiary academic or vocational
education significantly reduces the likelihood of an involuntary separation.
Taken together, the chapters of this dissertation clearly indicate at least three im-
portant policy considerations. First, in order to design effective educational policies,
policymakers need to understand the heterogeneous effects of those policies. Either for
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a primary school intervention or a labor market adjustment, it is crucial to know who
is affected by such intervention and by how much. For example, this dissertation shows
that for less able individuals investing in education is more profitable and that the best
instructional practice for their learning is having a teacher’s aide in class. Second, de-
pending on the target group of a given intervention, policymakers need to understand
how the intervention affects that particular group. Simply looking at average effects on
the entire population is certainly useful, but not sufficient. As this dissertation shows,
educational practices, returns to education, and even job loss determinants are highly
heterogeneous according to individuals’ observed and unobserved characteristics.
The third consideration, which brings together the first two, is probably the most
relevant in economics of education: efficiency. Given that resources (e.g., funds, teachers,
and infrastructures) are limited, public policy has to design efficient educational policies.
For example, if the objective is to increase average student test scores, then reducing class
size is probably the most efficient way. However, if the objective is to rise the performance
of low-achieving students or close the achievement gap, then the most efficient way is
introducing a teacher’s aide. Therefore, due to the heterogeneous effects that almost all
educational interventions imply, policymakers have to clearly define the target group of
the intervention, understand how the intervention would affect that specific group, and
then design the most efficient way to achieve the objective.
One additional remark concerns the generalizability of the results of this dissertation.
There are two dimensions we should consider before thinking about how it is possible to
generalize my findings to other contexts. The first dimension is purely spatial: what
other countries can learn from results of this dissertation? The question affects espe-
cially the policy implications based upon Swiss data. Institutions differ across countries,
and although Swiss labor regulations are more like in the U.S. than in most European
countries, many other economic conditions are very close to the European model (e.g.,
the educational system). Therefore, on the one hand, Switzerland’s uniqueness allows
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answering research questions that cannot be resolved by looking at other countries. On
the other hand, however, it might be too ambitious to entirely extend the results based on
Swiss data to other countries. Still, there are some lessons to be learned from the Swiss
case. For example, many Western countries undertook a compulsory education reform in
the last forty years, and the approach I follow in this dissertation can be easily adapted
to other countries. Thus, while the policy implications suggested in this dissertation
might be limited to the Swiss domain, the research design I use can be applied to several
contexts.
The second dimension we should consider is time. How can results obtained from
data from the past still be useful in today’s policy? This second question concerns
primarily the findings based upon Project STAR, which is the oldest data source I use
in the dissertation. For example, we might be concerned that early grades in the late
1980s and early 1990s are completely different for the ones of today. This concern is
legitimate but evidence shows, however, that the technology used in today’s education
did not change much since World War II, especially for early grades (Goldin and Katz,
2009). Moreover, the use of technology in school appears to have no impact on any
outcome analyzed (Bulman and Fairlie, 2015). Therefore, I am confident that the results
and patterns revealed by the STAR data are still actual and informative for policymakers.
The empirical findings and their policy implications described in this dissertation
point toward several avenues for future research. Regarding the effects of class size,
many researchers highlight the importance of character skills (Heckman et al., 2013).
One promising stream of research, initiated by Duckworth et al.,1 emphasizes the role
of perseverance and passion for long-term goal on educational achievement and labor
market success. As these skills are acquired and better developed in early grades, Project
STAR offers an optimal setting for studying perseverance and long-term commitment.
Moreover, almost all follow-up surveys of Project STAR contain enough information to
build a “grit score,” and future research might explore this avenue in more detail.
1See for example Eskreis-Winkler et al. (2014).
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Regarding the impact of education on labor market outcomes, this dissertation points
at several policy implications, as we discussed in the previous chapters. However, we did
not investigate the evolution over time of such effects. For example, it would be interesting
to examine how the distribution of returns to education evolved in the last decades. The
main policy question would be whether education mitigates wage and income inequality
over the years as suggested by Brunello et al. (2009). Our results would indicate that
education indeed has an inequality-reducing effect over time, because individuals at the
lower quantiles of the wage distribution appear to profit more from formal schooling.
However, a more thorough analysis is needed to provide a definitive answer to such
question.
Another potential research avenue pertains the evolution over time of earning losses
after a separation. Although this dissertation unequivocally shows that earning losses
after involuntary separation are large and persistent, we do not know whether this pattern
has worsened in the last three decades. Related research for the U.S. suggests that both
long term unemployment risk and immediate wage cuts of laid off workers increased
since the 1970s (Farber, 2010). However, it is still unclear whether the persistence of
the earning losses worsened over time and whether today’s determinants of being laid off
are the same as the determinants of thirty or forty years ago. Further analyses of the
wage loss patterns after lay-off and the determinants of lay-offs would help employees,
employers, and policymakers designing better contracts and social security systems in the
future.
In conclusion, my dissertation shows that typical estimates of the effects of education
on the average individual provide an incomplete characterization of the actual impact of
education on cognitive skills and labor market outcomes, and thus constitute a weak guide
for public policy. The results suggest that size and significance of such effects are hetero-
geneous, depending on individual observable and unobservable characteristics. Therefore,
going back to Plato’s opening quote, my dissertation demonstrates that education does
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indeed determine our future lives, but in a different manner for everyone of us.
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